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ABSTRACT 
 
This report presents a model in a mobile health care environment and 
uses a combination of existing technologies to build a privacy protection scheme. 
This work covers security issues in both the wireless and wired network, and 
proposes solutions to these issues. A framework using PKI to distribute digital 
certificates combined with strong encryption using the AES algorithm is 
described. Using this framework in combination with a RBAC model using 
location control we present some principles that will ensure privacy in a mobile 
wireless biomedical information collection service. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 THESIS DEFINITION 
There is a lot of research on new technology in electronic health care 
systems, and wearable sensors can be attached to the human body to record 
different biomedical signals, such as ECG, blood pressure, glucose analysis and 
respiratory parameters in a tele-home-care context. These sensors can 
communicate with a handheld device using a wireless interface, and the 
handheld device forwards the data to a database placed within the National 
Health Network (NHN) using mobile technology like GSM or GPRS. There are a 
few different proposed solutions to the technical setup of such systems using 
various technologies for the different parts of the system. 
It is important to focus on the security aspects in wireless networks 
communicating to a secured database in the NHN. For access to the medical 
information, it is important to maintain privacy and security. A wireless 
environment is especially exposed to intruders, and has special challenges 
towards confidentiality and message integrity.  
Evaluation of security protocols and algorithms can lead to new principles 
for protection of the recorded medical information sent from a sensor on the 
patient to an electronic health record (EHR) placed within NHN. A scenario 
should be developed in order to show the actual threats and necessary security 
precautions. 
The Data Inspectorate has very strict rules of privacy protection; in 
addition there are several laws and regulations to be followed for designing a 
solution that can guarantee privacy protection in a mobile biomedical information 
collection service. This project will propose some principles which should be 
independent of the actual technology used in order to give general design 
recommendations. 
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1.2 GOAL OF THE WORK 
The goal of this project is to propose some principles on how to maintain 
the security and privacy in a mobile health care network. The security and 
privacy has to be maintained in the short range wireless network, mobile 
communication, and between the different locations connected to the NHN. The 
principles should be independent of lower layer technologies, and hence can 
easily be adapted to several different scenarios.  
1.3 STATUS IN RELATED WORK 
There is some research on similar scenarios as ours, but the security 
aspects of those scenarios are very limited. CodeBlue [1] is a project under 
development by researchers from Harvard University and Boston University. This 
project group has developed a prototype structure for internal use in hospitals. 
This is to a certain degree similar to our scenario in the way that a patient is 
carrying a sensor that uses a wireless interface to transfer medical data to a 
PDA, and the PDA transfers the data wireless to a PC-system. The main 
difference from our project is that this prototype system is based on an ad hoc 
sensor network infrastructure. Results from experiments using CodeBlue is 
presented in the paper Sensor Networks for Medical Care [2], where they 
conclude that an important shortcoming of the CodeBlue project is a lack of 
security.  
A project focusing on the security in sensory networks is SPINS [3]. 
SPINS describes possible methods to solve the security problems associated 
with wireless medical sensors. Some of the problems arise because of limited 
processing power, and this limits the use of long crypto keys and heavy 
algorithms. This paper proposes methods to use in sensor network 
environments. SPINS consists of SNEP and Tesla. SNEP deals with data 
confidentiality, two-way data authentication and prove “fresh data”. Tesla deals 
with authenticated broadcasting for severe resource limited environment. 
Besides SPINS [3] and CodeBlue [1] we have found very little information 
about projects relating to our research problems. Most projects are currently only 
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focusing on the sensor itself, and do not take the security and privacy problems 
related to using such sensors into considerations. This may be because they 
don’t need heavy security, or they don’t yet have a working solution. Very limited 
official information is available on the security aspects in related scenarios.  
1.4 REPORT OUTLINE 
Chapter 1 is the introduction of the project. It includes the background for 
the project, the thesis definition, our goal with this project, and the status in 
related work. 
Chapter 2 describes our scenario. It gives a description of how a wireless 
sensor is used, how the data it records is handled and stored, and how this data 
is used by medical personnel to help the patient. This chapter also gives a few 
important elements restricting our solution. It states research questions that 
describe what areas we aim to research and what issues are most important in 
that area. 
Chapter 3 presents the laws and legislations relevant to a security solution 
in a medical environment. This chapter aims to describe what guidelines these 
laws and legislations put on our project. 
Chapter 4 presents important wireless technologies. We describe the most 
relevant wireless technologies, and what possibilities they can give us. 
Chapter 5 presents important security functions. We give a description of 
the most important hashing and encryption protocols, and try to evaluate their 
strengths and weaknesses. 
Chapter 6 presents important mechanisms to ensure privacy. We describe 
various variants of role based access control mechanisms and how they can 
solve privacy issues in our scenario. 
Chapter 7 contains our solution. We give propose our solution, and give a 
description on how we ensure security and privacy in the various parts of our 
scenario. 
Chapter 8 contains the discussion about our solution. We discuss why we 
chose the various elements in our solution, and how well the solution protects 
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security and privacy. 
Chapter 9 gives a conclusion to our work and gives a brief description of 
elements that need further development in this project. 
Chapter 10 contains references used in this report. 
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2 SCENARIO 
2.1 GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE SCENARIO 
In this project we will try to find a solution to ensure privacy in a mobile 
wireless medical environment. We have defined a scenario based on information 
from [4], [5] and a phone interview with Didrik Widding [6] from Well Diagnostics 
as a starting point to help us find a solution.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Scenario  
 
The use of a mobile wireless sensor gives the patient the possibility of 
being at home and doing his or hers normal daily activities while being monitored, 
but it also creates the need for new mechanisms for privacy protection [4]. For 
the patient to stay in his normal environment gives several benefits for both the 
patient and the quality of the monitoring. The patient will be more relaxed and the 
recordings will not be affected by the stressful situation at a hospital.  
A mobile wireless sensor is a compact electronic electrode attached to a 
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patient that can measure different biomedical signals. In this scenario we are 
using a sensor for electrocardiogram (ECG) recordings as an example. This 
sensor will continuously measure and wirelessly transmit sampled ECG-
recordings using a built-in RF-radio transmitter. The RF-radio receiver converts 
the ECG-samples by the use of a microcontroller before transmitting the ECG-
samples to a standard personal digital assistant (PDA). The sensor measures 
ECG-signals with a sampling frequency up to 1000 samples per second [86]. The 
signal is digitalized with 10 bit resolution, requiring up to 10 kb/s of bandwidth 
plus overhead to transmit to the PDA. The range of the RF-radio signal is up to 
10 meters. The transmitter chip used by the sensor described in [4] is a RF-
transmitter CC1050 from ChipCon, operating at 869.700 MHz, with a bit rate of 
up to 76.8kbit/s. The sensor will transmit continuously, and will be attached to the 
patient for 3 days to a week at a time. The sensor is a disposable unit, and will 
only be used once. 
A PDA is used to receive the information from the sensor [4], and will often 
have 400 to 600 MHz processor, 64 to 128 MB of internal memory and a memory 
card with capacity of more than 2 GB for storing data. The PDA has both a short 
range wireless RF-radio device and a GPRS card installed. The PDA is an 
“intelligent” unit, using automatic arrhythmia detection algorithms for analyzing 
the signals from the sensor and decides if the recordings are within normal 
values. As long as the signals are within normal values the PDA will regularly 
send an extract of the recordings to an electronic health register (EHR) 
connected to the Internet by the use of GPRS communication. If an abnormal 
ECG activity is encountered, the PDA will store 1 minute of the ECG recordings 
and then transmit the recordings to the EHR server.  
The wireless sensor will be attached to the patient by his attending 
physician, AP. The attending physician is the doctor with the main responsibility 
for the treatment and diagnostics of the patient’s current medical condition. The 
attending physician will most often be the patient’s regular general practitioner, 
but in can also be a doctor at a hospital or another general practitioner. The AP is 
responsible for the local EHR to where the recorded information is sent and then 
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stored. The EHR server is located at the AP responsible for the sensor; usually 
this is the patient’s regular general practitioners office.  
The AP will use the recorded information to help make a diagnosis and to 
give better medical treatment. According to the Personal Health Data Filing 
System Act he is also the one who can give co-workers who need access to the 
patients’ health information in order to give medical treatment [4]. The AP will 
have access to the information, and if needed he can request a second opinion 
from a cardiology specialist. This requires him to grant access to the specialist, 
and this might be problematic due to the sensitive nature of the information and 
the administrative organization of the medical system. There is also a need to 
grant access to mobile home health care personnel. In case of emergency the 
ambulance personnel might need access to information in order to give correct 
first aid, or a community nurse who visits the patient at home to provide daily 
health care. 
Norsk Helsenett [5], the Norwegian national health network is a closed 
network for electronic communication and cooperation. Norsk Helsenett is owned 
by the 5 different health regions in Norway. This network connects hospitals and 
other medical facilities either by using a secure VPN connection or being directly 
connected to NHN’s network. The regions do not have a common set of 
message types or standards, resulting in difficult communication and cooperation 
[5]. Several message standards are used to transport electronic medical 
information; a few examples are Journal+, MediLink, and InfoEDI [6] [5]. There is 
a wide variety of messages, depending of the data transferred. Each type of 
message will have different content and values, and they will be transported in 
different ways. These transmissions need various security and privacy protection.  
2.2 RESTRICTIONS 
In this scenario there are several restrictions on how we can form a 
solution. Due to the low processing and memory capacity of the sensor, the 
possible security and privacy methods and transmission bandwidth are 
significantly limited. Once the information is transported to the PDA it needs to be 
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analyzed and then transmitted to the EHR. This message transportation uses 
mobile transmission technology and the internet in our scenario, and thus needs 
a stronger level of security. There are some factors we have to take in 
considerations when selecting security and privacy protection mechanisms; for 
example battery capacity, bandwidth, processing capacity, and memory in the 
PDA. The PDA must be able to analyze and transmit data for several days 
continuously. The data must be protected during the transportation but also when 
stored in the EHR.  
2.3 THREATS 
There are several security and privacy threats relevant to this scenario. 
From a medical standpoint it is very important that the sensor only receives data 
from the correct sensor, and not from other devices in the same area. Keeping 
the integrity of the data is also very important to avoid false alarms or incorrect 
normal signals. The data must also be protected in such a way that possible 
attackers cannot get access to personal information about the patient.  
For the transmission of data from the PDA to the EHR, and between users 
in the national health network many of the same threats applies. Integrity, 
security and privacy must be protected when sending electronic messages 
containing sensitive medical and personal information. The electronic messages 
contain a lot more sensitive information than the data packets sent from the 
sensor and thus require a higher level of security protection. Non repudiation is 
especially important when sending messages regarding medication and 
diagnosis.  
A big threat to privacy in a wireless medical environment does not come 
from deliberate attacks, but from within the organization. Medical personnel that 
has unnecessary permissions to the EHR is a threat to the patient’s privacy. 
Access to medical journals stored in an EHR must be restricted exclusively to 
medical personnel that need access to a patient’s medical record in order to give 
the patient medical treatment. There are many different roles in the health care 
service and they need different levels of access to information. Effective and 
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secure ways of controlling access rights must be implemented. 
In a wireless environment it is always a possibility to loose the connection 
between the wireless devices involved. The signal from the sensor can be 
hindered by walls or getting out of range, and the signal from the PDA to the 
base station can be lost when driving through a tunnel or other reasons, even 
when the user is inside the house. The loss of such signals is not a threat to 
privacy, but mechanisms to handle such events are important.  
2.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Based on the scenario, restrictions and threats described above, we have 
formulated several research questions: 
1. What laws and legislations regulate the use, storage and 
transportation of sensitive medical information? Important 
research issues are to find out what restrictions laws and 
legislations have on our choice of solution. 
2. What wireless transportation technologies are available and how 
do they suit our needs, both for a short range and a long range 
transmission? Important research issues are bandwidth, range, 
availability, coverage area and supported security solutions. 
3. What mechanisms are available to ensure security and integrity 
during transmission? Important research issues are provable 
security strength, processing speed, and versatility. 
4. What mechanisms are available for identification and 
authorization of users? Important research issues are security, 
user-friendliness and suitability to a distributed medical 
environment. 
5. What electronic message standards are available? Important 
research issues are versatility, standardization and security. 
6. What mechanisms are available to ensure confidentiality and 
privacy? Important research issues are adaptability and security. 
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3 LAWS AND LEGISLATIONS 
The use and management of sensitive medical information is regulated by 
several laws and legislations in Norway. In [7] some relevant laws and 
legislations, and how they affect the use of electronic health records are 
presented. 
The purpose of the Personal Health Data Filing System Act [8] is to 
contribute to giving the national health services information and knowledge 
without violating the protection of personal privacy. §13 in this act states that the 
person responsible for the EHR can grant co-workers access to the information 
on the EHR. Access can only be granted to persons who need information to 
perform treatment, and in accordance to current regulations on client 
confidentiality. The Norwegian Data Inspectorate has stated [11] that based on 
§13 accesses can only be granted to personnel within a hierarchical organization 
context. This ruling prohibits access to the local EHR from personnel outside of 
the hospitals organizational domain, for example regular general practitioners. 
The managing director of the hospital is responsible for the EHR and the security 
mechanisms needed. Before sending information from the EHR system he has to 
make sure the receiving organization has fulfilled all security recommendations.  
The purpose of the Patients Rights Act [9] is to ensure that the population 
has equal access to healthcare services by granting all patients rights towards 
the National Healthcare Services. §5 in this act states that the patient has the 
rights to have access to his medical journal. Based on the intention of this act, 
one can claim that the patient himself is the proprietor of the information in the 
EHR.  
The Personal Data Act [10] states: “The purpose of this Act is to protect 
natural persons from violation of their right to privacy through the processing of 
personal data. The Act shall help to ensure that personal data are processed in 
accordance with fundamental respect for the right to privacy, including the need 
to protect personal integrity and private life and ensure that personal data are of 
adequate quality.”  The act contains requirements to protect against unauthorized 
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access to the EHR. Based on this act the patient can decide how he wants to be 
protected and to whom he wants to grant privileges to information in his medical 
journal.  
The Norwegian Data Inspectorate [12] has announced that transport of 
personal information outside of the attending physicians control must be 
encrypted using DES 128 (3DES) equivalent or better. The Data Inspectorate 
has not composed any instruction on what security measures are sufficient. The 
liable organization must do an assessment of what security objectives and 
strategy is needed, and decides what an acceptable security level in the given 
situation is. The Data Inspectorate can however review the assessments done by 
the liable organization. There are no direct requirements to the software used, 
but these will be part of the review done by the inspectorate. 
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4 WIRELESS TECHNOLOGIES 
4.1 SHORT RANGE WIRELESS TECHNOLOGIES 
The sensor prototype used in our scenario uses an RF-radio chip with no 
security mechanisms implemented. Our research showed at an early stage that 
Bluetooth or ZigBee were clearly better choices when considering data rate and 
supported mechanisms to ensure security and integrity, and we focused our 
research on these two short range wireless standards. 
4.1.1 Bluetooth 
Bluetooth is a short range radio standard designed for low power 
consumption. It was initially developed by Ericsson, and later formalized by the 
Bluetooth Special Interest Group. On June 14, 2002 the Bluetooth standard was 
published as IEE 802.15.1.  In 1998 the Bluetooth Consortium was formed by 
Ericsson, Intel, IBM, Nokia and Toshiba. Bluetooth is intended to replace cables 
for portable and/or fixed devices [13]. Bluetooth has been updated to new 
versions several times, and the 2 current core specification versions used now 
are 1.2 and 2.0 [14]. Version 2.0 is fully backwards compatible, but supports 
higher data rates than 1.2.  
4.1.1.1 Technical characteristics 
Bluetooth operates in the unlicensed industrial, scientific and medical 
(ISM) band at 2.4 to 2.485 GHz, using a spread spectrum, frequency hopping, 
full-duplex signal at a nominal rate of 1600 hops/sec [14]. The adaptive 
frequency hopping (AFH) was designed to reduce interference between wireless 
technologies using the 2.4 GHz spectrum. The AFH detects other devices and 
avoid the frequencies used and can take advantage of the available frequencies. 
The AFH hops among 79 frequencies at 1 MHz intervals to give high interference 
immunity. The range of Bluetooth devices range from 1 to 100 meters depending 
on the device class used. Class 1 devices use a power of 100 mW giving it a 
range of up to 100 meters, class 2 uses 2.5 mW and have a range of up to 10 
meters, and class 3 uses 1 mW and have a range of up to 1 meter. Class 2 is the 
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most commonly used. Version 1.2 has a gross data rate of up to 1Mbit/s and 
Version 2.0 with Enhanced Data Rate (EDR) has a gross data rate of up to 3 
Mbps. The effective transfer rates are respectively 723.1kbit/s and 2.1Mbit/s.  
4.1.1.2 Connection 
Bluetooth devices communicate in small groups of up to 8 devices, called 
a piconet, as shown in figure 2. One device plays the “master” and the rest (up to 
7) devices are “slaves”. Data can be transferred between master and 1 slave at 
any given time, and the master switches between slaves in a round robin fashion. 
Simultaneous transmission from master to multiple slaves is possible, but rarely 
used.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Piconet 
 
A Bluetooth device will transmit the following sets of information on 
demand: 
- Device name 
- Device class 
- List of services 
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- Technical information  
 
Any device can perform an inquiry to find other devices with which to 
connect, and any device can be configured to respond to such inquiries. If the 
device trying to connect knows the address to the device, it will always respond 
to inquiries with the information mentioned above if requested for it. Use of the 
devices services may require pairing or owner accept, but the connection itself 
can be established by any device and held until it goes out of range.  
All devices have a unique 48 bit address, but these are generally not 
shown in inquiries and instead user friendly “Bluetooth names” are used. These 
names can be set by the user and most devices come with a standard name set 
by the manufacturer. All devices also have a 24 bit class identifier, providing 
information about what class of device it is, for example mobile phone, headset 
or computer.  
Bluetooth devices can be paired to establish a trusted connection. By user 
input (a pin code) they can learn a shared secret key known as a “passkey”. A 
device can then cryptographically authenticate the identity of another device. 
With some devices, like wireless earphones, it is impossible for the user to enter 
a pin code, and the device has a fixed pin code, which can be entered into the 
peer device. Trusted devices can also encrypt information they transmit so no 
one can “listen in”. The encryption can be turned off, and the passkey is stored in 
the device’s memory, and not in the Bluetooth chip itself. The trusted connection 
can be canceled by either device at any time. Devices will generally require 
pairing or user input before it allows a remote device to use its services. 
4.1.1.3 Profiles 
In order to communicate with other Bluetooth devices a device must be 
able to interpret certain Bluetooth profiles [14]. These profiles define the possible 
applications. 24 profiles are defined and adopted by the Bluetooth SIG, for 
example: 
- Generic Access Profile (GAP) which provides the basis for all 
other profiles. This profile describes which features must be 
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implemented in all Bluetooth devices, generic procedures for 
discovering and linking to devices, and basic user-interface 
terminology 
- Basic Imaging Profile (BIP). This profile is designed for sending 
images between devices and includes the ability to resize, and 
convert images to make them suitable for the receiving device. 
- Human Interface Device Profile (HID) provides support for 
devices such as mice, joysticks, keyboards, etc. 
- Advanced Audio Distribution Profile (A2DP). Also referred to as 
the AV profile, it is designed to transfer a stereo audio stream like 
music from an MP3 player to a headset or car radio. 
 
4.1.1.4 Security 
On the link layer Bluetooth uses the SAFER+ algorithm for authentication 
and key generation, and E0 stream cipher for encrypting packets [14]. The link 
layer security is independent of possible application layer security. 
The SAFER+ (Secure and Fast Encryption Routine) algorithm is a block 
cipher with block size of 128 bits, and a default key size of 128 bits[14][15]. The 
cipher uses 8 rounds with 4 stages; a key-mixing stage, a substitution layer, 
another key-mixing stage, and finally a diffusion layer. Figure 3 shows the inner 
structure of SAFER+, which consists of: 
 KSA - A key scheduling algorithm that produces 17 different 128-bit 
sub keys.  
 8 identical rounds.  
 An output transformation - which is implemented as a XOR 
between the output of the last round and the last sub key. 
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Figure 3: Inner design of SAFER+ [17] 
 
The E0 is a stream cipher [14][16]. It generates a sequence of 
pseudorandom numbers and combines it with the data using a XOR operator. 
The key length is usually 128 bits, but may vary. For each iteration E0 generates 
a bit using 4 shift registers of different length (25, 31, 33, 39 bits), and two 
internal states, each 2 bits long. For each clock cycle, the registers are shifted 
and the two states are updated with the current state, the previous state and the 
values in the shift registers. Four bits are then extracted from the shift registers 
and added together. Then the algorithm XORs that sum with the value in the 2-bit 
register. The first bit of the result is output for the encoding.  
 
E0 is divided in three parts: 
1. Payload key generation 
2. Key stream generation  
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3. Encoding  
 
The setup of the initial state in Bluetooth uses the same structure as the 
random bit stream generator. We are thus dealing with two combined E0 
algorithms. Using the 128-bit key, Bluetooth address on 48 bits and the 26-bit 
master counter an initial 132-bit state is produced at the first stage. The output is 
then processed by a polynomial operation and the resulting key goes through the 
second stage, which generates the stream used for encoding. The key is a 
multiple of 2 varying from 8 to 128 bits length. 128 bit keys are generally used. 
These are stored into the second stage's shift registers. 200 pseudorandom bits 
are then produced, and the last 128 bits are inserted into the shift registers. It is 
the stream generator's initial state. 
Shaked and Wool showed in [17] that the PIN code used by some devices 
to add security can be easily broken, even on an old computer. They described a 
passive attack, in which an attacker can find the PIN used during the pairing 
process. They used less than 0.3 seconds to crack a 4 digit pin, as used by most 
devices using a pin code, on a Pentium III 450MHz computer and even faster on 
a new 3 GHz Pentium IV. If two Bluetooth devices perform pairing in a hostile 
area, they are vulnerable to this attack.  
In august 05 Lu, Meier, and Vaudenay [18] presented an attack on the E0 
stream cipher. Using a conditional correlation attack developed and optimized 
against Bluetooth two-level E0 they attack a recently detected flaw in the 
resynchronization of E0. Their best attack finds the original encryption key for 
two-level E0 using the first 24 bits of 223.8 frames and with 238 computations. This 
is the fastest and so far only practical known-plaintext attack on Bluetooth 
encryption.  
4.1.2 ZigBee 
4.1.2.1 Overview 
ZigBee Alliance was incorporated in August 2002, and announced the 
ZigBee standard in December 2004. The ZigBee standard was released public in 
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June 2005. The ZigBee Alliance consists of a group of non-profit companies of 
leading semiconductor manufacturers, chip suppliers, wireless IP suppliers, 
technology providers, OEMs, test equipment manufacturers, and end-users. 
Since the membership is open for everyone, the ZigBee Alliance is growing 
rapidly. The promoters in the ZigBee Alliance are BM Group, Ember, Freescale 
Semiconductor, Honeywell, Mitsubishi Electric, Motorola, Philips Samsung, 
Siemens, and Texas Instruments. In addition to the promoters, the ZigBee 
Alliance has almost 200 members [19]. Other wireless transfer methods are 
focusing on transferring large amount of data as fast as possible, but ZigBee is 
going the other direction. It focuses on low powered devices with a need for 
security and sending small amounts of data. The ZigBee standard was created to 
“enable reliable, cost-effective, low-power, wirelessly networked, monitoring and 
control products based on an open global standard” [20]. The most common 
devices that use ZigBee are industrial automation, remote metering, embedded 
sensors, medical devices, smoke and intruder alarms, interactive toys, building 
automation and home automation. 
4.1.2.2 General technical characteristics 
ZigBee operates in the European 868 MHz ISM band with one channel, 
the American and Australian 915 MHz ISM band with 10 channels or the 2.4 GHz 
ISM band with 16 channels. The data rate is 250 kbit/s in the 2.4 GHz band, 40 
kbit/s in the 915 MHz band, and 20 kbit/s in the 868 MHz band [22] [27]. 
Transmission range is typical between 10 and 75 meters. The ZigBee protocol 
supports up to 65 536 nodes. It has handshaking for transfer reliability.  
4.1.2.3 Stack architecture 
The ZigBee stack architecture (figure 4) is based on the standard seven 
layer OSI (Open Systems Interconnection) model [21]. 
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Figure 4: ZigBee stack architecture [25] 
 
The IEEE 802.15.4-2003 standard [23] defines the lower two layers in the 
OSI model, the physical (PHY) Layer and the Medium Access Control (MAC) 
Layer. The ZigBee Alliance uses these two layers as their foundations for their 
development [22]. As we can see from the gray layers in figure 4, they are 
providing the Network (NWK) Layer and the framework for the Application Layer 
(APL), which include Application Support (APS) sub-layer, ZigBee Device Object 
(ZDO), and the manufacturer-defined application objects.  
Physical Layer 
The IEEE 802.15.4-2003 standard defines the physical layer. This layer 
operates in two separate frequency ranges, the 2.4 GHz band and the 868/915 
MHz band [24]. Figure 5 shows the two layers. 
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Figure 5: Data rate in the physical layer [24]. 
 
Medium Access Layer 
The MAC layer in [23] is controlling the access to the radio channel. The 
mechanism used is called CSMA-CA. The MAC layer also transmits beacon 
frames, synchronization, and provides reliable transmission mechanisms.  
Network Layer 
The network layer has 3 main functions: join and leave networks, apply 
security, and route frames to their destinations [22]. In a coordinator device, the 
network layer has the responsibility to start a new network and discover what 
kind of application services nearby devices. It also assigns addresses to newly 
assigned devices. The network layer supports star, cluster three and mesh 
topology (see chapter 4.1.2.5).  
Application Layer 
As mentioned above, the APL layer consists of Application Support sub-
layer (APS), ZigBee Device Object (ZDO) and manufacturer-defined applications 
[22]. The APS is responsible for maintaining the tables for binding i.e. the ability 
to match two devices and forward the messages between two devices. The ZDO 
define the role of a device in the network (network coordinator, coordinator, or 
end device), initiate and/or respond to binding requests, and establish a secure 
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connection.  
4.1.2.4 Security 
ZigBee has several different security mechanisms [25], and are found in 
the MAC layer, NWK layer and the APS layer. Among them are freshness, 
integrity, authentication, and encryption.  
• The freshness checks prevent replay attacks. It uses incoming and 
outgoing freshness counters that are reset every time a new key is 
created.  
• The integrity checks prevent anyone from modifying the message, 
and supports up to 128 bit message integrity.  
• Authentication is handled either in the network level or the device 
level. The network level authentication is achieved when using a 
common network key. This will prevent attacks from outsiders, and 
it has very little memory cost. The device level authentication is 
achieved when using unique link keys between pair of devices. This 
prevents attacks from both outsiders and insiders, but has a higher 
memory cost.  
• ZigBee supports 128 bit AES encryption. This encryption can be 
used either at network level or device level, and is handled the 
same way as authentication. The encryption can be turned on or off 
without impacting the freshness, integrity or authentication.  
 
ZigBee can also add security to frames. Figure 6 shows how the ZigBee 
Security can add headers to the data frames at the MAC, NWK, and APS layers.  
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Figure 6: Security to the data frames [25] 
 
4.1.2.5 Topologies 
ZigBee supports 3 types of topologies [22]: Star, Cluster tree and Mesh. 
 
 
 
Figure 7: ZigBee topologies [22] 
 
Star topology 
In a star topology the network is controlled by a PAN coordinator (network 
controller). All end devices can only talk to the coordinator. The coordinator is 
almost always in a listening mode, except when new end devices are trying to 
connect. The star topology supports up to 65 536 end devices [22]. It is a very 
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simple layout and has low latency [26].  
Cluster tree topology 
In a cluster tree topology [22] the tree structure is rooted at the PAN 
coordinator. The coordinator initiates the network, and the children (end devices) 
routes through parents in a hierarchy. It uses a multi-hop topology to increase the 
network range. The cluster tree topology is not ideal for network devices that 
require low latency [26].  
Mesh topology 
The idea with mesh topology [22] is that messages can be routed from 
any source to any destination. The way this is done is that every FFD is 
functioning as a router for all its neighbors. Like cluster tree topology, the mesh 
topology uses multi-hop topology to increase the network range. It has high 
reliability, since the messages can go many routes. If one or more of FFD 
disconnects, the messages still gets to the destination, but uses another route 
than it normally does. This way it is self configuring. Since this topology depends 
on the routers, it may not be ideal for battery driven networks, as the routers will 
have relatively large power consumption [26].  
4.1.2.6 Device types 
ZigBee coordinator (ZC) 
Only one coordinator is required in each ZigBee network [26]. It is the 
most capable device in the network, and initiates the formation. It is the root of 
the network tree, and might bridge to other networks. It acts as a PAN 
coordinator (FFD) and as a router when the network is formed. The ZC also acts 
as a repository for security keys. The coordinator is also assumed to be the trust 
centre. The trust centre is responsible for allowing new devices into the network 
and for distributing keys. It is possible for the trust centre to be a dedicated 
device. 
ZigBee Router (ZR) 
The router is an optional component [26] in a ZigBee network. The routers 
associate with the ZC or with other previously associated ZR. The ZR acts as a 
coordinator (FFD) and is used as a local address allocation/de-allocation device. 
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It is used in multi-hop routing of messages. The ZR also looks after its own 
ZEDs.  
ZigBee End Device (ZED) 
The ZED contains very little functionality [26]. It is limited to communicate 
with its coordinator. The ZED is not allowed to associate or participate in routing. 
It requires the least amount of memory and is therefore cheaper than ZC or ZR. It 
has low power consumption since its parent puts it to sleep.  
4.1.2.7 Discovering devices 
When a new device is installed in the network, it will initiate queries to 
discover already active ZigBee devices in the network. The request is either an 
IEEE address request [22], which is unicast, or a NWK address request [22], 
which is broadcast. When the unicast request is sent, it assumes the NWK 
address is known. When the broadcast request is sent, it carries the known IEEE 
address as payload. The response on these queries is dependant on the three 
device types mentioned above: ZED, ZR and ZC.  
• The ZED is responding the query by sending its own IEEE or NWK 
address.  
• The ZR is responding the query by sending its own IEEE or NWK 
as well as the IEEE and NWK address of all the other devices 
connected to the ZR. 
• The ZC is responding the query by sending its own IEEE or NWK 
as well as the IEEE and NWK address of all the other devices 
connected to the ZC.  
4.1.2.8 Keys 
There are 3 different key types [25] used in ZigBee; master key, link key 
and network key. The master key is used as basis for long term communication 
between devices, and can be either factory installed or be set up over the air or 
using out-of-band mechanisms. The link key is used for security between two 
devices. The link key is also used to authenticate devices to the coordinator 
device. The network key is used for security in a network.  The link and network 
keys can be factory installed, be set up using a symmetric key-key exchange 
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handshake or be sent from the trust center. 
4.1.2.9 Hardware 
A wide range of ZigBee transceivers that are suited for use in a wireless 
sensor are available on the commercial market, from suppliers like ChipCon, 
CompXs, Helicomm Inc. and others. Newer models can come with built in 
hardware support for data encryption and authentication using AES on the link 
layer. An example of such a chip is the ChipCon CC2510 [28]. The CC2510 is a 
powerful 2.4 GHz ISM band System-on-Chip designed for low-power and low-
voltage wireless communication applications. This chip includes a dedicated 128-
bit AES coprocessor to minimize the MCU usage when encrypting. It also has a 
dedicated DMA controller which moves data from a peripheral (in our case the 
sensor) to the memory with almost no intervention from the MCU. This way the 
MCU workload is reduced to a minimum. The chip has a 32KB of programmable 
flash memory and 4KB of RAM. This chip is developed to be energy efficient and 
have a low unit cost.  
The ZigBee device installed in the PDA will most likely be an SD or CF 
card. Since our PDA must have a GPRS card, which usually is a CF card, the 
ZigBee card will be an SD card. An example of a ZigBee SD card is produced by 
C-Guys [29]. They are a company that specializes in developing different SD and 
SDIO devices, such as SD controllers, memory cards, adapters and card 
readers. One of their products is a ZigBee SDIO card for use in PDA. The SDIO 
card is using the standard ZigBee frequency, the 2.4 GHz ISM band, has 250 
kbps data rate and 10 meter range. 
4.2 MOBILE TRANSMISSION TECHNOLOGIES 
4.2.1 GSM 
GSM (global system for mobile communication) is the most popular and 
successful digital mobile telecommunication system in the world. At the end of 
March 2006, there were 1.79 billion GSM subscribers in over 200 countries [30]. 
The main goal of GSM [31] was to allow users to roam internationally between 
mobile operators. The system should provide voice services compatible to ISDN 
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and other PSTN (public switched telephone network) services. Since the GSM 
system is digital, it is considered a second generation mobile phone system (2G), 
and replaced the first generation analog systems. In Europe GSM is using 
several different frequency specters, most common are GSM 900 and GSM 1800 
[32]. GSM 900 is using 890-915 MHz for uplinks and 935-960 MHz for downlinks. 
GSM 1800 is using 1710-1785 MHz uplink and 1805-1880 MHz downlink. Typical 
transmission power is 2W for GSM 900 and 1W for GSM 1800 due to smaller cell 
size [31]. The main GSM service is telephony, and is offering at least as good 
quality as analogue telephones with 3.1 kHz bandwidth. Some other services 
GSM provide are SMS/EMS/MMS (short message service/ enhanced message 
service/ multimedia message service), free emergency numbers, identification, 
redirection, and forwarding. The users authenticate themselves with a SIM 
(subscriber identity module) card rather than with the mobile station (MS). GSM 
900 is allowing data rates up to 9600 bit/s for non-voice services. 
GSM security 
GSM offers several security services [31], and they are found either in the 
SIM card or the AuC (authentication centre, a separate system in the network 
that contains the algorithms for authentication and the keys for encryption). The 
SIM card stores personal data and a secret key Ki, and is only accessed with a 
four digit PIN number [31]. After MS authenticates itself, the MS and BTS (base 
transceiver station) encrypts all voice and data.  There are 3 types of algorithms: 
A3 for authentication, A5 for encryption and A8 for generation of the cipher key. 
The algorithms are very weak, but it is possible for the network providers to use 
stronger algorithms for encryption or user can provide stronger end-to-end 
encryption. To encrypt the messages, a key Kc is created by using the individual 
key Ki and a random number by generated by the A8 algorithm. The Kc key is 
calculated both in the MS (SIM) and the network, and is not transmitted over the 
air interface.  
4.2.2 GPRS 
GPRS (general packet radio service) is a packet-oriented operation in the 
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GSM system, often called 2.5G, since the technology lies somewhere between 
2G and 3G (2nd and 3rd generation mobile technology) [33]. The idea behind 
GPRS is that all or some GSM-channels (time slots) are combined to one 
channel with higher capacity [31]. While GSM was primarily designed for voice 
transmission, GPRS is a more data-oriented transmission. The transmission is 
packet-oriented so that many users can transfer data when they need it, and 
don’t use bandwidth when they have nothing to send. This type of transmission is 
especially designed for frequent transmission of small volumes of data, e.g. 
typical web requests or web response. The overall goal is the provision of a more 
effective and cheaper packet transfer for typical Internet applications that rely 
solely on packet transfer. The ISP is usually taking charge for the data volume 
transferred instead of charging for the connection time [34]. By doing it this way, 
the user is “always on”, and no connection has to be set up for the transfer.  
For each new GPRS radio channel, the GSM can locate between one and 
eight time slots within a TDMA frame [31]. All time slots can be shared by the 
active users. It is possible to get a transfer rate to 170 kbit/s if you have max slots 
and are using the fastest coding, but a more realistic bit rate is 30-80 kbit/s [33]. 
CS-4 is the fastest coding scheme, but the least robust. This coding is available 
near the Base Transceiver Station (BTS).  CS-1 is the slowest coding scheme 
but is most robust and is available when the Mobile Station (MS) is further away 
from the BTS. The GPRS operators usually reserves at least one time slot per 
cell to guarantee a minimum data rate. Table 1 [31] shows the typical data rates 
for GPRS if used together with GSM. 
 
Table 1: GPRS data rates in kbit/s 
Coding 
scheme 
1 slot 2 slots 3 slots 4 slots 5 slots 6 slots 7 slots 8 slots
CS-1 9.05 18.2 27.15 36.2 45.25 54.3 63.35 72.4 
CS-2 13.4 26.8 40.2 53.6 80.4 80.4 93.8 107.2 
CS-3 15.6 31.2 46.8 62.4 93.6 93.6 109.2 124.8 
CS-4 21.4 42.8 64.2 85.6 149.8 128.4 149.8 171.2 
 
Users can specify a QoS-profile themselves. This determines the service 
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precedence (high, normal, low), reliability class and delay class of the 
transmission and user data throughput.  
The latency of GPRS is incurred by channel access delay, coding for error 
correction, and transfer delay in the fixed and wireless parts of the network. Due 
to these parts involved, the latency is very high, even with small packet sizes 
[31]. A round trip is often higher than 1 sec, even with packets as small as 128 
byte. Table 2 shows some examples of the delay classes with different service 
data units (SDU) sizes. 
 
Table 2: Delay classes in GPRS according to [35] 
 SDU size 128 byte SDU size 1024 byte 
Delay class Mean 95 percentile Mean 95 percentile 
1 <0.5 s <1.5 s <2 s <7 s 
2 <5 s <25 s <15 s <75 s 
3 <50 s <250 s <75 s <375 s 
 
GPRS Security  
A MS (Mobile Station) that are using GPRS are considered a part of the 
internet and are assigned a private IP address [31]. The operator translates the 
IP address into global addresses at the GGSN (Gateway GPRS support node) 
using a NAT (Network Address translation) [31]. The advantage of this approach 
instead of giving the MS an “ordinary” IP address is to protect the MS against 
attacks. The private IP addresses are not routed through the internet, so it is 
impossible to reach an MS from the internet. Other security mechanisms are the 
same as GSM. 
4.2.3 EDGE 
EDGE (enhanced data rates for GSM evolution) is a digital enhancement 
of GSM, and the next step towards 3G and UMTS (EDGE is also called 2.75G 
[36]). EDGE is using an enhanced modulation scheme and other techniques to 
get data rates up to 384 kbit/s using the same carrier size and frequencies as 
GSM. EDGE does not require any changes in the GSM core networks, but the 
base stations have to be upgraded [37]. Besides better data rate, the most 
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important addition to GSM is CAMEL (customized application for mobile 
enhanced logic) [31]. CAMEL [38] is an intelligent network support, and the 
services offered are especially effective when a subscriber is roaming between 
international network operators. Examples are no-prefix dialing and seamless 
MMS messages from other countries [37]. EDGE is backward compatible with 
GPRS, and will use GPRS as transmission in those areas without EDGE support. 
Norway’s largest telecommunication company, Telenor, has very good national 
EDGE coverage [39], and offers a download rate of 100-200 kbit/s and upload 
rate of 50-75 kbit/s. 
4.2.4 UMTS 
UMTS (universal mobile telecommunication system) is a third generation 
mobile technology used in Europe and Japan, and the 3G successor of GSM 
[40]. To avoid very high implementation cost, UMTS try to reuse as much 
GSM/GPRS technology and infrastructure as possible [31]. It is especially 
designed for high-speed services like video telephony. All signals use the same 
frequency band, a 5 MHz wide band licensed to network operators [31]. The 
signals are multiplied with a chipping sequence which is unique to each user. If 
someone tries to tap the signal, it would appear as noise to him if he don’t know 
the spreading code [31]. In its initiation phase, UMTS has a theoretical bit rate of 
384 kbit/s in high mobility situations, and up to 2 Mbit/s in stationary user 
environments [41]. It takes twice as many base stations as GSM to achieve the 
same coverage, and to get fully fledged UMTS features including Video on 
Demand, a base station need to be set up every 1-1.5 km [31]. Some of the 
downsides of UMTS (as it is today) are: very poor coverage, poor battery life on 
the MS, impossible to provide complete UMTS features in rural areas, and lack of 
consumer demand for 3G [31] [40]. 
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5 SECURITY 
5.1 HASHING 
Hash functions are the most versatile of all cryptographic primitives [49]. It 
can be used for encryption, authentication, and a simple digital signature. The 
typical use of a hash function is digital signatures. The idea behind hashing is to 
take a long string of bits (or bytes) as input, run a hash function, and produce a 
fixed length hash sum [43]. If you have a message (m) and a hash (h), you are 
signing h(m) instead of signing m. The reason for signing h(m) is that the 
message (m) are usually very large, up to millions of bits, but the hash function 
are usually between 128 and 256 bits, thus making it much faster and more 
effective. 
One of the practical problems with selecting a hash function, is that there’s 
only a couple methods to choose from [42]; the SHA family and MD5. There are 
a couple of alternatives, but they have not been tested thoroughly enough to trust 
them. A typical hash function is shown below. 
 
 
 
Figure 8: A typical hash function 
 
5.1.1 MD-5 
MD5 [44] is a cryptographic hash function used to verify data integrity. It 
was developed by Ronald Rivest in 1991 to replace MD4, because MD4 proved 
to have some security weakness.  
When using MD5, the message is split into blocks of 512 bits [45]. The last 
block is padded, and includes the length of the message. MD5 has 128-bit hash 
value that is split into four words of 32 bits, each with a compression function h’ 
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with four rounds. Each round mix the message block and the state, with a 
combination of addition, XOR, AND, OR and rotation operations on 32-bit words. 
This way each message word is used four times. After the four rounds of the h’ 
function, the input state and the result are added together to produce the output 
of h’. The structure of operating 32-bits words is very efficient on 32-bits CPUs.  
One of the basic ideas behind hash functions [45] is that it is collision 
resistant. There are no known attacks on the MD5 function, but a collision of the 
compression function occurred in 1996. For modern applications, the 128-bit 
hash size is insufficient, and it is possible to find real collisions in about 264 
evaluations of the hash function. This made security experts to recommend a 
replacement. One of them was SHA-1. 
5.1.2 SHA-0 
SHA (Secure Hash Algorithm) [46] is a set of cryptographic hash 
functions. The first standard was just called SHA, but is now referred to as SHA-
0. It was developed in 1993 by NSA (National Secure Agency) and published as 
a US government standard. It was found a weakness in this function, and NSA 
developed a fix which they published as an improved version called SHA-1. 
5.1.3 SHA-1 
SHA-1 [55] is the successor of SHA-0 (and MD5) [46], and was developed 
in 1995. It is used in a wide area of security applications, like TLS, SSL, PGP, 
SSH, S/MIME, and IPSec. SHA-0 and SHA-1 is based on the same principles as 
MD4 and MD5 [55], and produces a 160 bit message digest with a maximum size 
of 264 bits. It is, unfortunately, 2-3 times slower than MD5. 
SHA-1 has a 160-bit state consisting of five 32-bit words [55]. It uses four 
rounds that consist of a mixture of 32-bit operations. SHA-1 uses a linear 
recurrence to stretch the 16 words of a message block to the 80 words it needs, 
to ensure that each message bit affects the mixing function at least a dozen 
times. 
The main problem with SHA-1 is the 160-bit result size. Collisions can be 
generated in only 280 steps, but it is reported that it can be generated in as few as 
  31  
Børthus & Engh                                     Privacy Protection in a mobile Biomedical 
Information Collection Service 
263 steps [47] 
 
 
 
Figure 9: SHA-1. Source [46]
 
Description: A-E is a 32 bit word. F is a non-linear function that varies. 
<<<s denote a left bit rotation by s places, and s varies for each operation.    
denotes addition modulo 232. Kt is a constant. 
5.2 ENCRYPTION 
5.2.1 3DES 
The Norwegian Data Inspectorate has stated that data files have to be 
encrypted with at least 128 bit 3DES encryption to be counted as secure [12]. 
3DES [48], or Triple DES, is a block cipher formed from the Data Encryption 
Standard (DES) [49] by using it three times. There are two variations of this 
method: 2TDES and 3TDES. The difference between them is that 2TDES is 
using 2 different keys, and 3TDES is using 3 different keys. 
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Figure 10: Three successive encoding with DES [48] 
 
3TDES has following specification: Three 56-bit DES keys = 168 bits + 
parity bits = 192 bits. The effectiveness is counted as only 112 bits because of 
the exposure to the man-in-the-middle attacks. The best know attack on the 
3TDES requires 232 known plaintexts, 2113 steps, 290 single DES encryptions and 
288 bit memory.  
3TDES is not longer considered a very good encryption method. It is being 
replaced by its successor, AES with its better security mechanisms. AES has a 
larger block size, longer keys, freedom from crypto analytic attacks, and proves 
to be up to six times faster than 3TDES. 
5.2.2 AES 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [50], also known as Rijndael is a 
block cipher. In 2000 NIST, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 
chose Rijndael as the new encryption standard for the US government. NIST 
selected the Rijndael algorithm in front of 4 other competitors based on the 
combination of security, performance, efficiency, ease of implementation and 
flexibility [51].  
Rijndael is a block cipher and uses a substitution-linear transformation 
network with 10, 12 or 14 rounds, depending on the key and block size. The key 
and block size can be individually specified to 128, 192 or 256 bits. A data block 
to be encrypted by Rijndael is split into an array of bytes, and each encryption 
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operation is byte-oriented. Only block size of 128 bits is adopted in the AES 
standard. The AES does not describe how to handle and distribute keys, and 
need a secure key management infrastructure to maintain its high level of 
security. AES is about 6 times faster than 3DES in software implementations. 
5.2.2.1 Overview of the AES cipher 
This overview of the AES algorithm is based on information from the AES 
standard [52], [49] and the wikipedia.org [50] page on AES. AES is a block cipher 
with a fixed block size of 128 bits and a variable key size of 128, 192 or 256 bits. 
The 128 bit message input block is segmented into 16 bytes. The data structure 
for their internal representation is a 4 x 4 matrix. Like the DES algorithm, AES 
comprises a plural number of iterations of a basic unit of transformation: “round”. 
Depending on the size of the key, AES uses 10, 12 or 14 rounds. A round 
transformation in AES is denoted by: Round(State, RoundKey). 
State is a round-message matrix, and is treated as both input and output 
and a length of 128 bits; RoundKey is a round-key and is derived from the input-
key via key schedule. All round-keys are 128 bits, also when the encryption key 
is 192 or 256 bits. The key schedule is an algorithm for computing the sub-keys 
for each round in a product cipher from the encryption (or decryption) key. The 
execution of a round will cause the elements in of State to change value. For 
encryption the State input to the first round is the plaintext message matrix, and 
the output from the last round is the cipher text message matrix. For decryption 
they are respectively cipher text and plaintext message matrix.  
Each round, except the last round, consists of 4 stages: 
 
1. SubBytes 
2. ShiftRows 
3. MixColumns 
4. AddRoundKey  
 
All rounds are identical with the exception of the final round, which does 
not include the MixColumns transformation. The round transformations are 
invertible for the purpose of decryption.  
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5.2.2.2 SubBytes 
This function provides a non-linear substitution on each byte of State. In 
the SubBytes step, each byte in the array is updated using an 8-bit S-box. A 
substitution box (or S-box) is a basic component of symmetric key algorithms, 
and takes some number of input bits, m, and transforms them into some number 
of output bits, n. This operation provides the non-linearity in the cipher. The S-
box used is derived from the inverse function over GF(28), known to have good 
non-linearity properties. Non-linearity is an important property for a block cipher 
to prevent differential cryptanalysis. 
 
 
 
Figure 11: AES SubBytes [52] 
 
5.2.2.3 ShiftRows 
The ShiftRows step operates on the rows of the state; it cyclically shifts 
the bytes in each row by a certain offset. For AES, the first row is left unchanged. 
Each byte of the second row is shifted one to the left. Similarly, the third and 
fourth rows are shifted by offsets of two and three respectively. In this way, each 
column of the output state of the ShiftRows step is composed of bytes from each 
column of the input state. 
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Figure 12: AES ShiftRows [52] 
 
5.2.2.4 MixColumns 
In the MixColumns step, the four bytes of each column of the state are 
combined using an invertible linear transformation. The MixColumns function 
takes four bytes as input and outputs four bytes, where each input byte affects all 
four output bytes. Each column is treated as a polynomial over GF(28) and is 
then multiplied modulo x  + 14  with a fixed polynomial c(x) = 3x  + x  + x + 23 2 .  
 
 
 
Figure 13: AES MixColumns [52] 
 
ShiftRows and MixColumns are intended to achieve a mixture of the bytes 
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positioned in different places of a plaintext message block.  
5.2.2.5 AddRoundKey 
In the AddRoundKey step, the subkey is combined with the state. For 
each round, a subkey is derived from the main key using the key schedule; each 
subkey is the same size as the state. The subkey is added by combining each 
byte of the state with the corresponding byte of the subkey using bitwise XOR. 
This stage provides necessary secret randomness to the message distribution.  
 
 
 
Figure 14: AES AddRoundKey [52] 
 
To decrypt, we invert the 4 functions of each round, and implement them 
in reverse order. The AddRoundKey is its own inverse and the same for both 
encryption and decryption. 
5.2.2.6 Security in AES 
Three different key lengths, 128,192, and 256 are supported by AES, 
making it possible to choose stronger security or better efficiency. All key lengths 
are secure enough to be used for most levels of classified information. Only for 
extreme security requirements is it required to use 192 or 256 bit key lengths. 
The American National Security Agency has conducted a research on the 
strength of the AES algorithm [53] stating: 
“The design and strength of all key lengths of the AES algorithm (i.e., 128, 
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192 and 256) are sufficient to protect classified information up to the SECRET 
level. TOP SECRET information will require use of either the 192 or 256 key 
lengths.” 
The security of AES can be affected by poor implementation of the 
algorithm itself in hardware, firmware or software, or insecure supporting key 
management infrastructure. The most common attacks on a block cipher are 
attacks on implementations of the cipher with a reduced number of rounds. As of 
2006, the best known attacks are on 7 rounds for 128-bit keys, 8 rounds for 192-
bit keys, and 9 rounds for 256-bit keys. AES has 10 rounds for 128-bit keys, 12 
rounds for 192-bit keys, and 14 rounds for 256-bit keys. The [51] states that 
unless an attack much more efficient than exhaustive search is discovered, the 
AES cipher will remain secure for well beyond 20 years. 
5.3 KEY MANAGEMENT 
5.3.1 PKI 
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is a policy to establish a secure method for 
information exchange [49]. It is also a set of integrated services and 
administrative tools to create and manage applications based on public keys. 
This includes cryptographic methods, the use of digital certificates, certification 
authorities, and the system to manage the process. There are two key elements 
[49] in PKI: Public Key Cryptography and Certification Authorities (CA).  
5.3.1.1 Public Key Cryptography 
Public Key Cryptography is a form of cryptography and uses a pair of 
cryptographic keys designed as a private key and a public key, which are related 
mathematically [49]. The private key is kept secret by the user and the public key 
may be widely distributed. Generally, if user Bob shall send a message to user 
Alice, Bob will contact Alice and ask for her public key. Alice sends Bob her 
public key, and Bob uses it to encrypt his message. Bob will then send Alice the 
message, encrypted with Alice’s public key, and the only way to decrypt the 
message is to use Alice’s private key [54].  
Some examples of public key techniques are: Diffie-Hellmann, DSS, 
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ElGamal, RSA, and various Elliptic Curve techniques [56].  
5.3.1.2 Certification Authority (CA) 
A CA is responsible for establishing and vouching for the identity of 
certificate holders [54].  A CA also revokes certificates if they are no longer valid 
and publishes certificate revocation lists (CRLs) to be used by certification 
verifiers. The certificates are issued by a CA based on information provided in 
the certification request and settings contained in a certification template. A 
certification template is the set of rules and settings that are applied against 
incoming certificate requests. The most common digital certificates in PKI use the 
X.509 Digital Certificate format and usually contain the following [54]: 
• The user’s public key 
• The user’s identity, such as name and e-mail address 
• The validity period of the certificate 
• The digital signature of the issuer, which attest to the validity of the 
binding between the user’s public key and the user’s identifier 
information.  
There are different levels of certificates based on the need for functions. 
As a general rule, the higher level of the certificate, the stricter are the policies for 
verifying [54]. PKI supports hashing to keep the integrity of the data. 
5.3.2 Smart card 
Smart cards are pocket sized plastic cards with embedded integrated 
circuits. There are 2 broad categories of cards; memory cards and 
microprocessor cards [57]. The standardization of smart card systems is an 
ongoing process. One of the standards most referred to is the ISO-7816 
standard. 
A memory card contains non-volatile memory that can store information 
and perhaps some specific non-programmable security logic [58]. An example of 
a memory card is a prepaid phone card. They can also be used as a high 
security alternative to magnetic stripe cards. Memory cards can only perform 
fixed operations.  
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Microprocessor cards contain memory and microprocessor components. 
These cards can process data on the card and can used for a variety of 
applications. Microprocessor cards can provide secure access to networks, be 
used as SIM card in mobile phones and as electronic wallets [58].  
Smart cards are engineered to be tamper resistant and are very suitable 
to hold personal digital signatures that can be used as authentication to grant 
access to secure networks [58].  
5.4 ELECTRONIC MESSAGE STANDARDS 
In the Norwegian Health Network there are several different message 
standards used today. The five regions have developed their own solutions to 
secure message structures. The “S@mspill 2007” [59] strategy is being 
developed to improve electronic interaction between the regions. One of the 
initiatives in this strategy is to develop a coordinated implementation of electronic 
message standards. “Kompetansesenter for IT i helse- og sosialsektoren”, KITH, 
[60] is responsible for developing standards for secure electronic interaction in 
the health and social services sector. Several standardized messages are 
developed for the most routine exchanges of structured information, for example 
epicrisis, physician referral, requisition, and laboratory test results. These 
electronic messages are made in conformity to different message standards, like 
EDIFACT, XML and ebXML.  
5.4.1 EDI, EDIFACT and XML 
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) is the computer to computer exchange 
of structured information, by agreed message standards [61]. EDI is specific 
interchange methods agreed upon by national or international standards bodies 
for the transfer of business transaction data. The EDI standards were designed 
to be independent of lower layers and can be transported using standard Internet 
protocols like SMTP or FTP. There are 3 major standards, only one of which is 
international; UN/EDIFACT (United Nations/Electronic Data Interchange for 
Administration, Commerce, and Transport) [62]. 
The EDIFACT standard is developed under the United Nations and has 
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been adopted by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) as the 
ISO 9735. The standard describes the formats, character sets, data elements, 
and syntax to be used in EDIFACT conforming messages [62]. EDIFACT has a 
hierarchical structure, with the top element being a message. A message is a 
sequence of groups and segments. Each group or segment can be marked as 
mandatory or conditional, and may be specified to be repeated. A group is like a 
message a sequence of groups or segments. Detailed information about the 
various defined message standards can be found at [62]. The European 
Electronics industry adopted UN/EDIFACT as the global standard for traditional 
EDI applications. 
Message standards based on XML are competing against EDIFACT. An 
EDIFACT message is smaller than a XML message, but the XML message is 
easier to understand for humans. An example of an XML based message 
standard is RosettaNet [63]. The RosettaNet standard is an open standard, and 
defines message guidelines and implementation frameworks for interactions 
between companies. Another emerging standard based on XML is the ebXML 
standard. 
5.4.2 ebXML 
ebXML [64], Electronic Business Extensible Markup Language, is an 
international initiative established in 1999 by The United Nations Centre for Trade 
Facilitation and Electronic Business (UN/CEFACT) and the Organization for the 
Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS). UN/CEFACT and 
OASIS have joined forces to initiate a worldwide project to provide a 
standardized way to exchange business data expressed in XML, from one 
computer application to another or between people and computers. ebXML is an 
open standard based on XML that that enables the global use of electronic 
business information in an interoperable, secure and consistent manner [64]. 
ebXML has five layers of data specification, including XML standards for: 
• Business process specifications 
• Collaboration protocol profiles and agreements  
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• Core data components 
• Messaging 
• Registries and repositories 
 
The ebXML e-business framework is not in itself a standard, but is a 
container for several key standards administered by UN/CEFACT and OASIS. 
The following 5 ebXML standards are approved by International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) as the ISO 15000 standard, under the general title, 
Electronic Business eXtensible Markup Language: 
• ISO 15000-1: ebXML Collaborative Partner Profile Agreement [65] 
• ISO 15000-2: ebXML Messaging Service Specification [66] 
• ISO 15000-3: ebXML Registry Information Model [67] 
• ISO 15000-4: ebXML Registry Services Specification[68] 
• ISO 15000-5: ebXML Core Components Technical Specification, Version 
2.01[69] 
 
5.4.2.1 Business Process Specifications 
One of the objects of ebXML is to capture and describe trading partners’ 
business practices and interactions systematically, and represent them 
accurately and independently of any specific way of implementing those 
transactions. The business process specifications [64] contain the models of the 
interactions describing the services among trading partners. They identify the 
trading partners and their roles in the interactions, detail the associated 
messages exchanged, including the data content within such messages. The 
business processes used in ebXML can be captured as XML documents or 
represented in UML. Since ebXML specifications are designed as modules, it is 
optional for an industry that has already described its processes, messages, and 
core components to apply this specification. The development and management 
of business process specifications will most likely be done by industry 
organizations and standards bodies, and not individual companies. 
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5.4.2.2 Collaboration protocol profiles and agreements  
ebXML uses the term collaborative process for the business process used 
to exchange messages or establish e-business services [64]. The ways that 
parties can exchange data are captured in an XML document called a 
collaboration protocol profile (CPP). These CPPs are often listed in ebXML 
registries and are useful in the process of finding new trading partners. A CPP 
indicates specific capabilities supporting business processes, with references in 
ebXML business process models. The CPP is an XML document describing 
three main functions of the company’s e-business capability:  
• Process specifications. Defines electronic business functions and services 
supported by the company. 
• Document exchange. Specifies services provided to connect the process 
specifications to the transport functions for sending and receiving, 
including encryption and decryption and additional digital signatures. 
• Transport. Identifies the services supported for sending and receiving e-
business messages. 
 
Because the CPPs list the capabilities of companies the intersection of 
them can be used to find common ground when negotiating a collaboration 
protocol agreement (CPA). The parties use business process definitions in the 
CPAs to configure their e-business systems when exchanging messages. The 
contents of the CPA are based on each company’s CPP which makes both 
parties interested in making certain that the CPPs and CPAs are accurate and 
current. The CPPs are listed in the registry, but the CPA is a concern only to the 
two companies and would not likely be indexed in an industry registry open to 
public view. The CPA provides a set of concrete and tangible interactions 
between the trading partners and as a result both sides can enforce the conduct 
of these interactions. 
5.4.2.3 Core Data Components 
 An important aspect of the ebXML standard is interoperability, defined 
here as the ability for companies in different industries to exchange and 
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understand data among different business areas and technologies. In order to 
achieve this, ebXML defines a series of common data items called core 
components that appear in different business messages but have common 
meaning [64]. These common meanings enable companies using business terms 
in one industry to relate to their counterpart in another industry. The specification 
of core components can get complicated and political, and will likely be done by 
industry organizations and standards bodies. An example of a core component 
can be a person buying goods; he can be called customer, client, or end user. 
The context of a core component provides the specific business meaning of the 
data item, as determined by the business process and other variables, while the 
core component itself provides the basic interchangeable part. 
5.4.2.4 Message Services 
The ebXML message services is a standard that makes it possible to 
exchange electronic business documents between trading partners using 
standard communications protocols like HTTP or SMTP. The ebXML Message 
Service Standard describes the message structure used to package payload 
data between parties, and the behavior of the Message Service Handlers that 
send and receive messages [64]. The standard is independent of both the 
payload and the communications protocol used.  
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Figure 15: ebXML Message Service Handler Components [66] 
 
Services 
Figure 15 shows the structure of key functions provided by ebXML 
message services to exchange business messages between trading partners: 
• Message header processing: Creates the message headers by 
using data from end user application, collaboration protocol 
agreements and digital signatures and more. 
• Message header parsing: On the receiving end the message 
service extracts the data from the headers for processing. 
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• Security services: This includes creation and interpretation of digital 
signatures and authentication of the partners and authorization for 
further access.  
• Reliable messaging: Defines reliable delivery of messages with 
rules for persistence, retries, error messages, and 
acknowledgements. 
• Packaging: This function includes the envelopes for the messages 
as a whole, as well as dividing the message into containers for 
headers and payload. 
• Error handling: This function reports an error to the parties when 
the message handler or user application encounters an error. 
• Message service interface: Connects user applications to the 
message service handler. 
 
Message Package 
Figure 16 illustrates how ebXML configures the message as a series of 
layers. The outermost envelope is provided by communication protocols like 
SMTP or HTTP [64]. Everything within this envelope includes the message 
specifications as defined by ebXML. A MIME envelope encompassing the total 
soap with attachments package is the next layer in the structure. Within this 
package come two MIME containers, each with its own envelope, one for the 
ebXML headers and one for the payloads.  
ebXML leaves the definition of the payload to the discretion of the 
sender[66]. A message can carry multiple payloads if necessary. However the 
message manifest, a part of the header, must list each payload in the message. 
The content of a SOAP envelope is defined as an XML file and includes the 
overall ebXML but is itself a complete basic SOAP document, and has to parts, 
corresponding to a SOAP header and body. The headers contain important 
addressing, security, and management details [64]. 
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Figure 16: ebXML Message Structure 
 
The message header is a required element and contains fields like: From, 
To, CPAId, Message Data, SequenceNumber, Version and other required or 
optional fields.  
The specifications recognize and list some of the risks inherent in a 
business messaging service, and recommend a series of countermeasures. 
Inherent risks are unauthorized access, data integrity attacks, confidentiality 
attacks and more. Technical countermeasures discussed in the document 
include the use of digital signatures both on original messages and receipts, XML 
encryption and trusted date/time stamps. The countermeasures are either 
requirements or recommendations. 
5.4.2.5 Registries and repositories 
The terms registry and repositories are according to the ebXML registry 
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specification [67]:  
The ebXML Registry provides a set of services that enable sharing of 
information between interested parties for the purpose of enabling business 
process integration between such parties based on the ebXML specifications. 
The shared information is maintained as objects in a repository and managed by 
the ebXML Registry Services defined in the ebXML Registry Services 
Specifications. 
The ebXML Registry architecture consists of a Registry Service and ebXML 
Registry Clients [64]. The Registry Service provides the methods for managing a 
repository. The client is an application used to access the registry. The Registry 
Service is comprised of a set of interfaces used to manage objects and inquiries 
associated with the registry. The two primary interfaces for the Registry consist 
of: 
• A Life Cycle Management that provides methods for managing objects 
within the registry 
• A Query Management Interface that controls the discovery and retrieval of 
information from the Registry.  
 
ebXML envisions registries as open resources that companies can access 
at any time and find the objects they need to conduct business electronically. The 
objects can be DTDs, XML schemas, business process models or collaboration 
protocol profiles. The registries attach metadata, XML attributes, to the objects to 
classify the objects and enable management of them throughout their lifetime. 
5.4.2.6 Existing implementations 
ebXML has been adopted by the UK's National Programme for Information 
Technology (NPfIT) [70]. A central component of the National Health Service 
(NHS) Care Records Service is the Transactional Messaging Service (TMS) 
Spine using the ebXML Messaging Service OASIS Standard. ebXML is used to 
provide reliable messaging functionality. National services such as the Electronic 
Booking Service (Choose and Book) and Electronic Transmission of 
Prescriptions are accessed using pairs of XML request and response documents. 
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These documents are transported within the NHS network as ebXML messages. 
A gradual implementation of the ebXML services has started with the Electronic 
Booking Service in a few GP surgeries in London and Yorkshire. It is foreseen 
that by 2010 the NHS Care Record and electronic prescriptions will be fully up 
and running. 
The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)[71], an 
agency of the Department of Health and Human Services, operates the Public 
Health Information Network Messaging System (PHINMS), with state and local 
health agencies, clinical facilities and medical labs across the U.S. PHINMS 
makes use of ebXML’s Messaging Service and Collaboration Protocol 
Agreement specifications.  
5.5 VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORK  
The scenario described in chapter 2.1 depends on secure data transfer 
between the different domains and users. Some of the data transfer uses 
electronic messages, but some is regular network traffic like database access. 
The messages can be encrypted to protect the content, but the database access 
needs to be protected in a secure network. In a distributed and mobile network 
like the one described in our scenario much of the data traffic will use the 
Internet, and needs to be protected. 
The definition of VPN is “A virtual private network (VPN) is a private data 
network that makes use of the public telecommunication infrastructure, 
maintaining privacy through the use of a tunneling protocol and security 
procedures” [72].  
A VPN makes it possible to share resources in a secure way over an 
insecure public network like the Internet. There are 3 important VPN technologies 
used: secure, trusted and hybrid VPN. Only secure VPN is relevant to our 
scenario. Secure VPN uses an encrypted secure “tunnel” to transport data over a 
public network. Tunneling is generally done by encapsulating the private network 
data and protocol information within the public network transmission units so that 
the private network protocol information appears to the public network as data. 
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Tunneling allows the use of the Internet, to convey data on behalf of a private 
network in a secure way. There are several secure VPN protocols, like IPsec, 
SSL and PPTP [73]. A properly chosen, implemented, and used secure VPN 
protocol can provide secure communications over unsecured networks, and 
provide protection of confidentiality and integrity, and sender authentication to 
ensure privacy. 
Secure authentication is very important when using a VPN solution. 
Authentication mechanisms can make use of what you know (pin code, 
password), what you have (smart card) or what you are (fingerprint, retinal scan) 
[73]. The use of one of the above will give weak authentication, but the use of 
two will give a much stronger authentication.  
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6 PRIVACY 
"Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups and institutions to determine for 
themselves, when, how and to what extent information about them is 
communicated to others" [74]. 
6.1 RBAC 
Role-Based Access Control [75] is a newer model of Mandatory Access 
Control (MAC) [76] and Discretionary Access Control (DAC) [77]. RBAC is an 
approach to restricting system access to authorized users. With RBAC, access 
decisions are based on the roles that individual users have as part of an 
organization. Roles are created for various job functions. The permission to 
perform certain operations is assigned to specific roles. Users are assigned 
particular roles, and through those role assignments acquire the permissions to 
perform particular system functions or to get access to particular data. Figure 17 
shows the RBAC model. 
 
 
 
Figure 17: The RBAC model [84] 
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The RBAC [75] model consists of five basic elements: Users, Roles, 
Objects (OBS), Operations (OPS), and Permissions (PRMS). Users are defined 
as humans, machines, networks and autonomous agents. Roles are considered 
a job function. Objects are the elements the roles have permission to operate. 
Permissions are the rights to each role. RBAC uses two relations to model the 
assignments of roles to users, and permissions to roles. The relations models are 
called User Assignment (UA) and Permission Assignment (PA), as shown in 
figure 17. This way a user can have many roles, and a role can many users. 
Likewise, a role can be granted several permissions, and a permission can be 
given to several roles.  
RBAC follows the concept of least privilege [75], meaning a role only has 
as much rights as it need to perform its duties. RBAC provides administrators 
with the capability to place constraints on role authorization, role activation, and 
operation execution. These constraints have a variety of forms. Constraints 
include cardinality and mutual exclusivity rules which can be applied on a role-by-
role basis. The use of roles adapts well to a medical environment with doctors, 
nurses and other well-defined jobs. Simple administration and separation of duty 
are other important elements. 
6.2 CONTEXT-BASED ACCESS CONTROL 
A context-based access control scheme [78] begins with the protection 
afforded by either a user-based or role-based access control design and takes it 
one step further. Access control decisions in a user-based or role-based 
framework answer questions similar to “Should this person (or a person who 
performs this job function) be allowed to access this type of data?” The 
equivalent context based question would be, “Should this person (or a person 
who performs this job function) be allowed to access this type of data as it 
applies to this particular patient?” Context-based access control takes into 
account the person attempting to access the data, the type of data being 
accessed and the context of the transaction in which the access attempt is made. 
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The purpose of context based access control is to have a privacy and security 
policy that still allows special events to be handled correctly, without the need to 
create new roles or give individuals additional rights. By adding additional 
elements into a user based or role based access control scheme, one can 
develop solutions that are context based. 
6.3 DAFMAT 
The DAFMAT authorization framework [79] consists of two components, Hybrid 
Access Control Model and a Logic-driven authorization engine. DAFMAT support 
three types of authorization: normal, emergency and context-based. The support 
of these three types of authorization is the most powerful feature of DAFMAT.  
The Hybrid Access Control Model is a combination of RBAC and DTE [78]. 
Users are assigned roles, and they get all their permissions from their given role. 
A user can have multiple roles and multiple users can have the same role. To 
implement the concepts in RBAC you need to use a lower level access 
mechanism. One such access mechanism is Domain and Type Enforcement, 
DTE [78], where subjects have a domain label objects have a type label. The 
users are subjects, and the attributes in a database are objects. Each Domain-
Type pair has a set of allowable access modes associated to them. The data 
structure that gives the access modes for all Domain-Type pair is called the 
Domain-Type Access Matrix. The operations allowed to a subject are given by its 
assigned Domain.  
The Logic-driven authorization engine [79] has two functions: 
• The engine formulates the user authorization request based on the user 
actions. The request is designated one the three types (normal, emergency and 
context-based) of authentication.  
• It approves the authorization requests if the current request is valid. 
  
The main authorization entities in the DAFMAT model are user, role, 
subject, and object-type. The limitation of this framework is that it does not model 
purposes and data policies. 
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Figure 18: The DAFMAT model [79] 
 
The tasks of the different entities are:  
• Role: Represent the job position. The definition of a role is “a job 
function within the organization that describes the authority and 
responsibility conferred on a user assigned to the role” [80] 
• Subject: These are programs, user agents or executables that are 
invoked by a user to carry out business process functions with 
delegation of certain roles.  
• Domain: The domain is a high-level enterprise functional area 
within which role should perform. In our case this can be a doctor in 
a hospital who performs tasks within the hospital domain.  
• Object-Type: An Object-Type represents a group of objects that 
carry related information and can be processed in a similar way.  
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6.4 PARBAC 
Since DAFMAT [79] has some limitations on model purpose and data 
policy, PARBAC [81] will try to compensate these limitations by expanding 
DAFMAT to add the authorization entities purpose and policy. When a user 
requests access to certain data, the business purpose and privacy policy that 
pertains to that patient will be checked, in addition to his role and permission.  
 
Figure 19: The PARBAC model [81] 
 
The new entities in PARBAC:  
• Purpose: The Purpose entity is also referred to as business 
purpose. This is a concrete and specific purpose of an action.  
• Tasks: The purpose cannot be directly associated with <Role, 
Permission> pairs. The reason is that the system can’t decide the 
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purpose of a role if two roles have the same permission for different 
purposes and a user is assigned to both roles. Tasks function as an 
intermediate entity between roles and purposes. A role invokes one 
or more subjects in order to perform some task.  
• Object-Policy: This is a data usage policy, which means that every 
user’s personal information should have separate policies. In our 
case, this policy will be based on the privacy policy of the owners of 
the medical database combined with the user’s special 
preferences.  
 
Even though this model has some features that can be used to ensure 
data privacy, it has its downsides too. This model is built upon a trusted system, 
so if the object policy is changed in any way, it may affect the security. The 
PARBAC model can also only protect the data privacy of the users, and does not 
consider other privacy issues, such as privacy invasion by data mining and 
anonymity. The task of implementing the logic-driven authorization engine is 
complicated and makes this method more difficult to implement  
6.5 MEDAC 
All of the security components availability, integrity, and confidentiality 
have to be satisfied in health care environments. MAC [76] and DAC [77] both 
have their limitations in achieving this security, but a combination of these two 
has been proved to satisfy the security requirements. This combination is a 
security policy called MEDAC (MEdical Database Access Control). The MEDAC 
security policy is based on the Bell-LaPadula security model [82]. The basic idea 
with MEDAC is: All authorized users will have access to the database, with its 
account associated to a predefined user role. The user role represents the user 
task in the application, and every user role has a clearance level and a category 
set. The category set depends on the user role and the sets of data it need to 
access. The clearance level represents the trustworthiness of the user role. The 
data sets are assigned a sensitivity level and a category set. The sensitivity level 
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reflects its sensitivity depending on the context, content, exterior factors, or 
specific situations. The category sets depends on the use and the nature of the 
data set.  
6.6 DIMEDAC 
The main feature in DIMEDAC [83] is location control combined with 
RBAC. DIMEDAC security policy is developed to provide privacy in distributed 
database systems. The most important feature used to accomplish this is the 
user location control. The access to a certain subject from a certain location 
depends on the role activated by the subject, the sensitivity of the data to be 
accessed, and the location from where the subject is accessing.  
The user location can be viewed in two ways:  
a) As a site, that is a workstation from where a user logs in the system.  
b) As an administrative domain, that is a part of an organization where a 
unique administration policy is in effect. Possible types of administrative domains 
in medical applications can be clinic, department, and hospital.  
We assume that in distributed medical database systems each user acts 
in the context of an administrative domain wherein a local security policy is in 
effect. The privileges of a given user role should be reduced when acting 
remotely. Depending on whether the access is local or remote, two different ways 
of location control is performed, as shown in figure 20.  
Local access  
Layer 0: During the identification and authentication procedure the site of 
the user is assigned as the initial set of user locations. The final set of user 
locations depends on the user role that will be activated during the next layer 1.  
Layer 1: The user activates a role, from the set of initially defined roles at 
his home-location that corresponds to his specific task. The possible user 
locations related to the activated user role are added to the user location set. The 
final set of user locations is used in subsequent remote accesses during the 
same session.  
Remote access  
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Layer 0: During the identification and authentication procedure the user 
has to be identified to the remote site of the distributed database. However, the 
home site of the user could also perform the remote user identification and 
authentication.  
Layer 1: The user activates a similar (or the same) user role in the target-
site, depending on the specific user task and the trustworthiness of the 
administrative domain from where the user is accessing. The activated remote 
user role forms the ability of the user to access a number of data sets at the 
target-site, on the basis of the need-to-know requirements of the user that have 
been already satisfied by his local security administrator. However, this fact 
means that every local security administrator can decide about the authorization 
of subjects of its administrative domain on objects of other domains. It is obvious 
that there must be a limit in the penetration that other administrators can do in 
the access control policy of each administrative domain. This can be 
accomplished in the next layer by eliminating the user role permissions set on the 
basis of the assigned set of user locations.  
Layer 2: For each subsequent user access request, the set of permissions 
to be examined is related not only to the specific user role but also to the set of 
user from where the user is accessing.  
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Figure 20: The DIMEDAC model [83] 
 
DIMEDAC is defined on RBAC components and supports both MAC and 
DAC [83]. The access control mechanisms are the hyper node hierarchies and 
the three dimension access matrix. Hyper node hierarchy concept is a way of 
associating users, data or locations with their given security level. There is a 
strong similarity between the concept of a security label (consisting of the 
security level and the set of categories) and a role. As a result, security levels 
can be implemented by means of the position (depth) of each role in the 
hierarchy and categories can be derived from the ancestor nodes reached when 
moving to the root of the hierarchy. All hyper nodes are connected by a link or a 
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branch. Hyper nodes connected by branches constitute a hyper node hierarchy 
(HNH, figure 21), where multiple inheritances are supported. The HNH concept is 
used to construct User Role, Data Set, and User Location hierarchies.  
The User Role Hierarchy (URH) includes at least the role “All Users”, in 
the lowest level. We then add roles to appropriate levels and connect them with 
links and branches. The nodes at the top of the hierarchy have the lowest level of 
clearance. To derive a clearance level we initialize the level to be 1 and the 
category to be an empty set. We then find the entry of the role and move towards 
the top of the hierarchy, adding 1 to the level every time we follow a branch to a 
higher level. This is repeated until we reach the role “All Users” and have all 
nodes that combine the category set.  
 
 
 
Figure 21: Hyper Node Hierarchy [83] 
 
Data Set Hierarchies (DSH) are constructed in a similar way, except that 
the data sets on top of the hierarchy are of the highest level. To derive the 
sensitivity level we initialize the level to 5 and subtract while moving to the top of 
the hierarchy.  
User Location hierarchies (ULH) have the highest domains at highest 
levels and sites as leaves. Locations can be either physical locations or 
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organizational domains.  
When we add the user location dimension to a classic access matrix we 
get a three dimension access matrix, 3DAM (Figure 22).This matrix can be 
implemented as multiple access matrices, one for each administrative domain. A 
user role UR in a user location UL has the authority to access data set DS with 
an access mode AM. An authorization rule of this kind can be expressed with a 
quadruple (UR, UL, DS, AM).  
In a large distributed system, it is difficult to have a centralized 
administration of access rights. DIMEDAC proposes a use of global and local 
access control mechanisms. Authority to administer regional objects can be 
granted to the regional security administrator. Control over the regional 
administrators can be centrally administered, but they can have considerable 
autonomy within their regions. This process of delegation can be repeated within 
each region to set up sub regions and so on. By separately defining each one 
subject (global or local user role) and its permission set to access remotely any 
defined object of the system from any defined location we can reduce authorized 
privileges of a given global user role. The perspective is to reduce authorized 
privileges of a given global user role while its location is going farther on.  
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Figure 22: The three-dimension access matrix (3DAM) [83] 
 
Each administrative domain will inherit catalogues and hierarchies of user 
roles, data sets and user locations from their ancestor administrative domains. 
Then these hierarchies will be defined to meet the special needs of the specific 
domain. By exploiting the inheritance in the hierarchies it is possible to reduce 
the huge amount of data that needs to be defined, and make it easier to manage 
rights in all domains.  
6.7 SRBAC 
SRBAC (Spatial Role-Based Access Control) [84] is basically a RBAC 
model [75] with a location control extension, as shown in figure 23. The location 
control used in SRBAC is assigning permissions to a role limited by the location 
in which the user is situated. A user can therefore have different permissions for 
two or more locations, which is called a dynamic role. The SRBAC model [84] 
consists of five basic components: Users, Roles, Permissions, Sessions, and 
Locations. Users are the units that can establish a connection with the system 
resources to perform activities. Roles are a set of permissions to access system 
resources. Permissions are the approvals to perform operations on one or more 
RBAC objects. Sessions are a symbolic expression of a user’s session. 
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Locations are a symbolic expression of where the user is. SRBAC use a concept 
called logical location domains. This is a method to reflect an organizational 
location infrastructure and organizational security policy. The SRBAC controls a 
whole domain which consists of many partitions where a partition is normalized 
set of locations. The UA (user assignment) represent a user to a role. The PA 
(permission assignment) represents the permissions based on roles and location.  
 
 
 
Figure 23: SRBAC model [84] 
 
SRBAC utilizes a location dependant role hierarchy similar to standard 
RBAC [84], but with the location element. A role ri inherits all permissions from 
role rj in location L if all permissions of rj in location L are permissions of ri in 
location L and if L is a normalized set of locations (a partition). Two roles with the 
same permissions can be mutually exclusive for one location, but the user can 
have authorization for both roles in another location. The model is thus defined 
as both Spatial Static Separation of Duty (SSSD) relation and Spatial Dynamic 
Separation of Duty (SDSD) relation [84].  
SSSD relations enforce constraints on the assignment of users to roles 
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regarding their location [84]. If a user is assigned to a role with special 
permissions on one location, the user cannot be assigned to another role in the 
same location if the roles are in conflict with the each other.   
SDSD relations enforce constraints on the permissions assigned to roles 
that are activated of a user’s session [84]. It allows users to be assigned to 
several roles when activated in separate sessions for specified locations, if the 
roles are not in conflict with each other.  
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7 OUR SOLUTION 
7.1 OVERVIEW 
In this chapter we will present our proposed solution to protect privacy in a 
mobile biomedical information collection service. Figure 24 show an overview of 
the system. We suggest using the ZigBee standard for communication between 
the sensor attached to the patient and the PDA. ZigBee has built-in support for 
our recommended cryptographic algorithm AES. We recommend the use of AES 
encryption with a key size of 128 bits to ensure the integrity and confidentiality of 
the transmitted recordings. The PDA will analyze the recorded data and transmit 
an excerpt to the local EHR located at the attending physician’s office (which 
most often is the RGP, as mentioned in chapter 2.1) using the GPRS standard 
for mobile data service. Transmitted excerpts will be sent using message 
packages conforming to the ebXML message standard. ebXML is also to be 
used for all messages sent internally in the National Health Network and for 
information transport to and from external users like general practitioners and 
mobile health care services like ambulance personnel and community nurses. 
Several different message types will be used and the various defined ebXML 
message structures will be maintained and distributed by a central registry and 
repository located in the national health network. The content of the ebXML 
messages will be encrypted using the AES cryptographic algorithm with a key 
size of minimum 128 bits. We propose key management using a PKI system with 
digital certificates issued by a central certificate authority located within NHN. 
These digital certificates will be used to generate and distribute session keys for 
the AES encryption/decryption scheme used to protect the message content. All 
messages will be signed using the digital certificates.  
Access rights to the medical databases will be controlled using a role 
based access control system. We propose an implementation of a location 
control in the RBAC server to limit the access of medical information to those 
who actually need access, i.e. qualified medical personnel in the right locations. 
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To improve security and privacy protection in the system, medical personnel will 
be required to identify themselves using a smartcard with a personal certificate to 
access the most sensitive patient information on the EHR. 
 
 
 
Figure 24: Our solution 
 
7.2 SHORT RANGE WIRELESS COMMUNICATION 
7.2.1 Topology 
We are suggesting the use of ZigBee in a star topology (figure 25) for the 
short range wireless communication channel. The PDA is a full function device 
(FFD), has the responsibility as a network coordinator, and it may talk to any 
other devices. The sensors are reduced function devices (RFD), and can only 
talk to the network coordinator (PDA). It is easy to implement star topology and 
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the ways RFD’s and FFD’s are handled make this a very power efficient 
topology. 
 
 
 
Figure 25: ZigBee star topology 
 
The sensor has a built in ZigBee transmitter with a range of up to 10 
meters. The ZigBee standard comes with support for the security chosen for this 
transmission, AES. Even though the data rate is limited to a maximum theoretical 
bandwidth of 250kbit/s, this is sufficient for our use. The sensor will transmit the 
measured data continuously.  
7.2.2 Setup  
Figure 26 shows the initial setup process of the sensor. The sensor has a 
button which synchronizes communication with the PDA. When a patient is at the 
attending physician (AP) for attaching the sensor, the AP will press the button on 
the sensor to initiate the setup sequence with the PDA. The PDA is the 
coordinator device and acts as a trust centre that is responsible for accepting 
new devices into the network and distributes keys. Every sensor will have a 
sensor ID which is a unique identification for that particular sensor, like a MAC 
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address. This ID is used when setting up the sensor and the PDA and 
exchanging the link key. When the synchronization button is pressed the sensor 
will transmits its sensor ID to the PDA and ask the PDA to start the setup 
process. The PDA will display a message with the sensor ID asking the AP if the 
sensor can be accepted. If the AP confirms, the PDA and sensor will negotiate a 
link key using a symmetrical key-key exchange (SKKE) handshake. This link key 
is usually used for the duration of the sensors lifetime, but can be refreshed if 
needed. The link key will authenticate the sensor to the PDA and the PDA will 
only process data received from sensors that have had this manual setup 
process. Messages from other ZigBee devices will not be accepted. The initial 
setup phase can be vulnerable to attacks unless it is done in a secure 
environment like the doctors office. 
A single PDA can be used to process data from several different sensors 
attached to the same patient. The link key is unique to the PDA-sensor pair and 
is used to identify and authenticate the device in the network, guaranteeing that 
the PDA will only accept data sent from authenticated sensors. 
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Figure 26: Sensor setup process 
 
7.2.3 Security 
Message freshness is ensured by the freshness counter maintained by 
ZigBee devices for both incoming and outgoing messages. These counters are 
reset if link keys are updated. To ensure message integrity and protect the 
messages from eavesdropping we propose the use of the AES cryptographic 
algorithm with 128 bits key length. The example ZigBee chip mentioned in 
chapter 4 is built to support this encryption in a very effective way, and this 
enables us to have high security on even this low energy unit. A key size of 128 
bits will be highly secure for several years to come. The sensors get a device 
level authentication (chapter 4.1.2.4) by the link key used for the transmissions. 
This prevents inside and outside attacks. The use of strong encryption of the 
packets, and not using any private information about the patient in the packets 
ensure that the privacy of the patient is protected. 
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7.3 ELECTRONIC MESSAGING 
7.3.1 National Health Network 
The core in our scenario is the administrative centre of the National Health 
Network. The NHN will bed a centre where the CA, RBAC, the ebXML registry, 
VPN server, and the Core Journal are located. The core journal is a central 
database that contains a complete medical record for all patients. This core 
journal will be updated with information located in local EHR databases. The 
benefit of a core journal is the possibility of a single patient journal containing all 
medical information about each patient.  
 
 
 
Figure 27: Overview of the core parts of National Health Network 
 
The CA server distributes the certificates to users. We suggest having the 
CA server as part of the NHN, but this server can also be administered by a 
trusted third party that supplies the NHN with all digital certificates needed. All 
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computers will have a digital certificate that identifies them to a specific location, 
and all users get a smartcard with a personal digital certificate, which will be used 
as personal identification. Not all actions require a personal certificate, but some 
actions will. For example when a RGP grants a specialist access to a patient 
journal the RGP will need to use his smartcard to verify his identity, as well as the 
specialist.  
Administration of users and their roles will be done by the RBAC server. 
The RBAC server contains all the roles available and which permissions the 
different roles have. All users connected to the national health network will be 
given one or more roles, and there has to be routines to update roles when 
needed and to remove them when a user no longer should have them. Local 
access control units will do the permission checks when users attempt to access 
local services. Each access control unit will contain the access matrices 
regarding all information stored in the respective domains/locations. These 
access control units will be updated by the RBAC server when changes are 
made to roles that are used on the access control units. 
The ebXML registry and repository is a database administering document 
type definitions (DTD) for the various message types used in the network. The 
server provides services for adding and updating DTDs, and services for 
accessing this information for outside parties who want to exchange messages 
conforming to the ebXML messages used in the network. 
Access to servers in the NHN requires a secure connection. We suggest 
the use of a virtual private network, VPN. Technologies like IPsec, SSL and 
PPTP can be used to encrypt this secure network. We propose the use of a 
central VPN server, where the users automatically establish a secure connection 
when they log on the network, identifying themselves using a smart card 
containing a digital certificate and a password or pin code. Using both a smart 
card and a pin code/password will provide a very strong authentication. The 
ebXML standard uses secure messages, but can be sent over the secure 
network because the standard is independent of the connection technologies. All 
medical personnel will use VPN when accessing remote resources, including 
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community nurses that are using GPRS to communicate with the EHR.  
The recorded information from the sensor will be stored at a local EHR, 
often located at a regular general practitioners office or in a hospital. An access 
control unit will administer access to the database based on user roles and 
locations. The different users in the office, like secretary, nurse and RGP will 
have different permissions to the EHR. The information in the local database will 
regularly be synchronized with the core journal. The core journal will log all high 
level access and changes to the medical journal, i.e. operations where the 
personal smartcard is needed.  
7.3.2 ebXML  
We propose the use of the ebXML message standard on the messages 
used to transport information. The ebXML message standard is independent of 
underlying transport protocols, and provides a message structure than can be 
adapted to all our needs. Each device in the network needs an ebXML client 
application to do packaging and preparation of the ebXML messages. The 
content of the ebXML message envelopes is encrypted using a 128 bit AES 
encryption. The message envelopes can contain any form of binary data. The 
ebXML standard defines reliable delivery of messages with rules for persistence, 
retries, error messages, and acknowledgements. The message will have a 
sequence number to avoid that re-sent messages can be accepted when they 
already have been accepted if a “received” message failed.  
7.3.3 Long range wireless communication 
We suggest the use of the GPRS standard as transportation protocol for 
the long range wireless transmission connecting the PDA to the Internet. Since 
the PDA only transmits periodically the GPRS bandwidth is sufficient for the 
message transportation we require. The PDA will analyze the data, package an 
excerpt of the data in an ebXML envelope, and use a normal GPRS compact 
flash card to transmit it to the EHR.  
The setup process of the PDA in the AP’s office includes several 
elements; digital certificate for the PDA, adding a sensor, patient ID stored on the 
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PDA, and a unique ID generated by the EHR to identify the messages sent from 
the PDA. When the PDA is initially set up the AP will store the name, address 
and phone number of the patient, so this information can be included in an 
emergency message if needed. A digital certificate will be loaded into the PDA 
while it is in its cradle connected to the AP’s computer. This certificate is used to 
sign the ebXML messages to authenticate them to the EHR so it will accept the 
message. The digital certificate is also used to negotiate a session key to use for 
the AES encryption of the message content. The session key will be regularly 
updated. The AP will go through the sensor setup process described in chapter 
7.2.2 for each sensor he attaches to the patient.  
The PDA will receive a unique temporary ID from the local EHR used to 
identify the patient. This ID is generated by the EHR and will be used when the 
PDA sends messages to the EHR. We use this ID to protect the patient’s identity 
during the wireless transfer of the sensor recordings. The PDA will analyze the 
received recordings from the sensor and package an excerpt in an ebXML 
envelope and transmit it to the EHR. The message containing the excerpt will be 
digitally signed using the digital certificate, and will also contain the temp ID, and 
the PDA ID, which may be the MAC address. The ID will be linked to the correct 
patient and the sensor ID number. The EHR will add the received excerpts to the 
correct patient’s journal.  
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Figure 28: Sequence diagram sensor – EHR 
 
If for some reasons the GPRS can not contact the EHR, the data will be 
stored on a flash card in the PDA, and sent at first opportunity. If the flash card is 
1GB, and the sensor sends data at 50 KB/s, the PDA can store over 5.5 hours of 
continuously data. Only excerpts of the data will be stored, enabling the device to 
store data for a long time if needed. An overview of the transmission is shown on 
figure 29.  
 
 
 
Figure 29: Overview of the transmission from the sensor to the EHR 
 
7.3.4 Security 
A secure network is dependant on secure key handling and correct 
identification and authorization of users. We propose the use of a PKI framework 
with digital certificates to maintain and distribute secure keys to all users 
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connected to the health network. The PKI framework will distribute digital 
certificates to all computers, and all personnel will have smart cards with a 
personal digital certificate. These digital certificates can be obtained, updated 
and revoked by a central certificate authority. We suggest that the CA should be 
located in the national health network, but these services can also be supplied by 
a trusted third party. We suggest using the international X.509 digital certificate 
standard, but other digital certificates can also be used, as long as they meet the 
requirements of the particular system in which it is to be implemented.  
There are two different digital certificates in this system; one is a personal 
certificate stored on a smartcard for the specific user, and the other will be a 
certificate stored on each computer. The personal certificate on the smartcard 
will contain the user’s identity. The smartcard will be used to authenticate the 
user in the network. Certificates for computers will contain information about the 
ID, location and administrative domain of the computer. All digital certificates will 
in addition contain to the public key, validity period and the digital signature of the 
issuer. To give some protection against theft of these personal smartcards, we 
suggest that the user is asked for a PIN-code or password when activating the 
smartcard. 
All messages are encrypted using 128 bit AES encryption. 128 bit session 
keys will be negotiated with the use of the public key included in the digital 
certificates. These session keys are unique to the two participants and will be 
used to encrypt the content of ebXML messages transmitted between them. New 
session keys will be negotiated for every new session. The encrypted messages 
are protected from eaves dropping and the unique link key ensures that the 
message can only be read by the intended receiver. All messages will be signed 
using the digital certificates to ensure non-repudiation. The use of personal 
information in messages should be limited, but the strong security will protect the 
content. 
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7.4 PRIVACY PROTECTION USING SRBAC 
7.4.1 SRBAC elements 
We propose a solution based on RBAC with location control. All users will 
be given access to information and resources based on their role and location.  
We will define users, roles, locations, operations, objects and permissions and 
propose as examples a limited number of roles, locations, operations, and 
objects to make the description simpler and more understandable. Users can 
have one or more roles, and will also have a location that combined with their 
role will give them access to the correct information in the correct patient 
journals.  
Figure 30 shows how the SRBAC model [84] can be adapted to our 
scenario. We have suggested some values for each element. The users are the 
persons that are accessing the network. Roles are the job description for the 
different users. Loc describes the different locations of the users. Operations are 
the different functions a user is allowed to do. Objects consist of different patient 
information. The permission element consists of possible combinations of 
operations and objects.  
 
 
Figure 30: SRBAC model adapted to our solution 
  76  
Børthus & Engh                                     Privacy Protection in a mobile Biomedical 
Information Collection Service 
 
7.4.1.1 Users  
We have several different users in the scenario described in chapter 2. 
The users are medical staffs in hospitals and medical offices that are to be 
accessing the Network. They can be regular general practitioners, emergency 
centre personnel, doctors, specialists, and nurses.  
7.4.1.2 Roles 
We have defined a few example roles to help describe the solution we 
propose. In a real implementation there will be more roles. Some users may hold 
more than one role at a time, and some roles are mutually exclusive. For 
example a doctor can be both an attending physician and a regular general 
practitioner at the same time, but he cannot be attending physician and patient at 
the same time. For simplicity sake we have given every specialist the role 
“Specialist”, but it should be divided into a more specific job description, i.e. the 
field that the specialist has as its specialty, e.g. cardiology specialist. Table 3 
shows a listing of the roles we propose. 
 
Table 3: Roles 
Role Description 
Regular 
General 
Practitioner 
The regular general practitioner role is held by regular 
practitioner who is appointed as a patient’s regular doctor. He 
has full rights to the patient’s medical journal, and can grant 
access rights to personnel who need it to perform medical 
treatment. 
Attending 
Physician 
An attending physician role is held by the doctor who has main 
responsibility for the current medical treatment of the patient. 
The regular general practitioner can also have the role attending 
physician to the same patients that he is RGP for and other for 
patients who for various reasons is under his medical treatment. 
Specialist The specialist is a physician with more expertise in its field than 
most general practitioners, and will sometimes be asked for a 
second opinion based on the measured readings from the 
sensor due to his knowledge. He will not need to know the 
patients personal information, only the data collected and other 
medical information needed to make a diagnoses. That means 
the specialist will have a lower clearance level than the RGP. 
Nurse Nurses will only need access to basic information like e.g. 
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allergies, what medication they use and what special care they 
need, and will only have medium level of clearance.  Community 
nurse will hold the nurse role, but she will be located to an 
external location. 
Emergency 
Centre 
Personnel 
Emergency centre personnel are the people working in the 
emergency centre. They have no access rights to medical 
journals, but can grant access to personnel that need it to 
perform medical treatment, like ambulance personnel and 
emergency room staff. 
PDA The PDA role is exclusively for PDA. When the sensor and PDA 
are set up at the attending physician, the PDA is linked with a 
particular patient. When the PDA is sending recorded data, it 
has the permission to write the data in the EHR. 
 
7.4.1.3 Locations 
While the previous sections are examples that can be implemented into a 
RBAC model, this section uses the Location element from the SRBAC model. A 
location LOC is a normalized set of locations L = {l1,l2,…,lk} that is a partition of 
the entire domain area Z. In our scenario the domain Z can either be a RGP 
clinic or a hospital, L1-L7 is the partitions of a domain, and l1-l8 are a selection of 
locations.  
We have chosen a limited number of locations. Locations can be small or 
large, ranging from a medical district down to a single workstation. Table 4 shows 
the domains Z, table 5 the selected partitions, and table 6 shows the selected 
locations. 
 
Table 4: The domains 
DOMAINS Z Description 
ZRGP The RGP clinic 
ZHospital The hospital 
 
Table 5: The partitions 
Partitions Description 
L1 RGP_office 
L2 GP_office 
L3 Medical_secretary 
L4 Cardiology_department 
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L5 Other_specialists_department 
L6 Medical_staff_department 
L7 Emergency_centre 
 
Table 6: The locations 
Locations Description 
l1 RGP_workstation 
l2 GP_workstation 
l3 Medical_secretary 
l4 Nurse_workstation 
l5 Cardiologist 
l6 Other_specialists_workstation 
l7 Public_health_nurse_workstation 
l8 Emergency_room 
l9 General_medical_staff_room 
 
We propose an example on how a domain can be built regarding the 
partitions and locations based on tables 4-6. 
 
ZRPG = L1+L2+L3 
L1 = {l1} 
L2 = {l2} 
L3 = {l3, l4} 
 
ZHospital = L2+L3+L4+L5+L6 
L2 = {l2} 
L3 = {l3, l4} 
L4 = {l3, l4, l5} 
L5 = {l3, l4, l6} 
L6 = {l2, l3, l4, l7, l9} 
L7 = {l2, l3, l8} 
 
7.4.1.4 Operations 
The operations are the different commands a user can perform on an 
object. The different operations we propose are read, write and change. The read 
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operation allows the user to look at the information on the EHR. The write 
operation allows the user to write and create new information on the EHR. The 
change operation allows the user to change the existing information. 
7.4.1.5 Objects 
We have given a few selected object examples with description in table 7. 
This is a small example and a real medical record contains several additional 
objects. We have selected a few to suit our scenario and show the intent behind 
the objects.  
 
Table 7: Objects 
Objects Description 
Patient identification  Patient Identification is values that uniquely identify a 
single patient, like name, address, and national identity 
number. This is sensitive information and access on this 
level is very limited. 
Sensor data  Sensor Data are all recordings transmitted by the 
wireless sensor, and will only be accessible for appointed 
physicians. 
Medical decisions  This is the decisions made by different medical staffs 
Diagnoses This is the diagnoses made by different medical staffs 
Special diagnoses  Special Diagnosis is given highest level, and is used to 
keep extra sensitive medical information, for example a 
HIV diagnosis. 
Patient number  The patient number is a global identification of the 
patient, created randomly by the EHR. It is not related to 
national security number or any other personal 
information. 
 
7.4.1.6 Permissions and roles 
The permission element is a combination of operations and object. An 
example of a permission can be read access on the sensor data. Another 
example can be write access on diagnoses. Every role will have a number of 
permissions based on its location. An example on permissions of the RGP role 
will be write access on all the objects mentioned in table 7, if the patient is 
located at the EHR at the RPG clinic.  
 Based on the personal data act the patient can decide whom he wants to 
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grant privileges to information in his medical journal. If medical personnel need 
access to a patient’s medical journal, the permissions will be given by the RGP or 
attending physician with the consent from the patient. In case of emergency, the 
emergency centre staff can grant special permissions to emergency personnel, 
based on the assumption that the patient would consent. A detailed example is 
given in chapter 7.5.2. 
7.4.2 Separation of duty 
To maintain privacy, the accessibility and limitations are a very important 
element. The locations are linked with roles to make a location/role pair that is 
used to grant doctors and nurses access to patients in their location and restrict 
them from accessing patient files belonging to patients residing in other locations.  
As an example, a particular user can have both the roles specialist (SP) 
and AP (attending physician). When he’s on a hospital, he may have access from 
the locations l2, l6, and l9, i.e. the GP_workstation, specialist_workstation and 
general_medical_staff_room respectively. As mentioned in chapter 6.7, SRBAC 
uses two elements called SSSD (Spatial Static Separation of Duty) and SDSD 
(Spatial Dynamic Separation of Duty) as shown in figure 30. In this case the 
SSSD will enforce constraint on the location l6, because it is exclusively for the 
specialist role (marked by the ellipse), and the AP role is not allowed to access 
the EHR from that location. To solve this, the user starts a new session with the 
role specialist only. The SDSD will control which locations the specialist role are 
allowed to enter for each session.  
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Figure 31: The SSSD and SDSD relations 
 
It is also possible to perform a separation of duty such that a user may 
never have both the role attending_physician (AP) and patient (P). That way it is 
impossible for a physician to write his own receipts.  
7.5 SITUATIONAL EVENTS 
7.5.1 AP contacts specialist 
If the AP need help to interpret the recorded results, he may want to 
contact a specialist. The AP will have to grant the specialist permissions to the 
selected patient’s medical journal. This is done manually for each patient.  Figure 
32 shows an overview of the parts involved. 
 
 
  82  
Børthus & Engh                                     Privacy Protection in a mobile Biomedical 
Information Collection Service 
 
Figure 32: A graphical overview when an AP contacts a specialist 
 
The specialist will be assigned permissions based on two factors; his role 
as specialist and his location. When the AP grants the specialist access, the 
location of the specialist will be added to the list of locations allowed to access 
the patient’s journal. The specialist role will only get a temporary access right to a 
limited number of objects on the specific patient. The temporary access rights are 
limited to only include permissions to medical information; the specialist will never 
have permission to access private information about the patient, like name, 
address, national identity number or birthday. To prevent the specialist of 
accumulating access to an increasing number of patients, the access rights given 
to the specialist are temporary with a predefined time to live. We propose a 
lifetime of 168 hours, or 1 week, for the temporary access rights, as this should 
grant the specialist sufficient time to review the patients journal. The access 
rights will be automatically revoked when they expire. 
For privacy reasons the EHR generates a unique temporary identifier the 
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selected specialist can use to access the selected patient journal without him 
knowing any personal information about the patient. The identifier will be used as 
a pointer to the correct patient journal when the specialist wants to access it. 
With the use of a unique identifier we can grant the specialist access to a patient 
without giving him access to personal information and this maintain the patient’s 
privacy. 
Figure 33 shows a sequence diagram describing the process when an AP 
asks for a second opinion from a specialist, and thus granting him temporary 
permissions. The AP asks the EHR to generate a unique identifier linked with the 
patient ID. EHR generates this ID and returns the temporary unique ID to the AP. 
This temporary ID can have a permanent lifetime of 1 week, and if the specialist 
need more time to look at the patient data, the AP will have to do this process 
once more. The AP will then update the SRBAC server with a temporary 
permission for the specialist. The update message contains the unique temp ID, 
a time limit set by the AP, the specialist role, and the specialist location. The 
SRBAC server will then update the access control unit with the same information. 
The AP will also send the unique temp ID and the time limit to the specialist. 
When the specialist are logging in to the AP’s local EHR, he will have to identify 
himself with his computers certificate, his personal smartcard and the unique 
temp ID he got from the AP. If the specialist’s identifier is valid and matches a 
patient journal in the EHR, he will be granted access to the patient journal for the 
time period decided by the AP.  
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Figure 33: Sequence diagram showing an AP contacting a specialist. 
 
7.5.2 Emergency message 
The RBAC system we propose can handle emergency messages. 
Whenever an emergency event is detected by the PDA, it will send an 
emergency message to the emergency centre with the name, address and phone 
number of the patient. The patient’s private information will be stored on the 
PDA, and typed in by the AP. This information will be used exclusively for 
emergency messages. When the emergency centre receive the emergency 
message, they will try to contact the patient, or send an ambulance if the patient 
doesn’t answer. Unless the emergency message is confirmed to be false, it will 
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grant the emergency centre personnel access rights to the patient’s journal. This 
will give the emergency centre permission to grant temporary permissions to 
other medical personnel that needs it. Examples of such personnel can be 
ambulance or emergency room doctors and nurses. 
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8 DISCUSSION 
8.1 LAWS AND LEGISLATIONS 
The laws and legislations presented in chapter 3 impose a few restrictions 
on our solution. The Norwegian Data Inspectorate has announced that transport 
of personal information outside of the attending physicians control must be 
encrypted using DES 128 (3DES) equivalent or better. We propose the use of 
the stronger AES algorithm. The AES encryption is both more secure and more 
effective than the older 3DES, and is more suited to be used in a mobile wireless 
medical environment. 
Based on the Personal Health Data Filing System Act the Norwegian Data 
Inspectorate has concluded that access to medical information can only be 
granted to personnel within a hierarchical organization context. In our solution we 
give access to a specialist outside the hierarchical organization context of the 
AP. Based on The Personal Data Act the patient can decide how he wants to be 
protected and to whom he wants to grant privileges to information in his medical 
journal. This can be used to argue that the AP can grant access to personnel 
outside the hierarchical organization context if medical treatment is dependant on 
it and the patient consents. In case of an emergency, the emergency personnel 
may grant themselves necessary permissions. We assume that in an emergency 
the patient would consent to giving the medical personnel these permissions, 
because in this situation the need for emergency treatment is more important 
than the patient’s privacy.  
8.2 SECURITY AND PRIVACY IN THE SHORT RANGE WIRELESS 
COMMUNICATION 
We propose the use of AES encryption between the sensor and the PDA. 
This encryption is proved to be very strong and will remain secure for several 
years to come. AES is also both more effective and more secure than the 3DES 
encryption required by the Norwegian Data Inspectorate. The sensor has very 
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limited processing capacity and the use of hashing functions to sign messages 
could have solved the integrity and authentication issues. Hashing functions does 
not provide the security required by the Norwegian Data Inspectorate. The 
requirements from the Data Inspectorate can be argued not to be applied on this 
short range transmission, but as long as better solutions like AES are available 
and practical we disregarded the use of hashing functions. 
A privacy issue is that the patient can be tracked using the ID of the 
sensor. The patient is using the sensor everywhere he goes; if eavesdroppers 
can find the sensor ID they can use this to track the movements of the patient. 
Both the recorded information and the sensor ID are encrypted and thus 
protected from eavesdropping. This ensures that the patient cannot be identified 
based on the ID of the sensor and prevents attacks where an attacker wants to 
track the movements of the patient. 
AES encryption can be implemented on all of the 3 most relevant 
transmission technologies; ZigBee, Bluetooth and RF-radio. We suggest using 
ZigBee because the ZigBee standard comes with native support for AES on the 
network layer, and that it is possible to get ZigBee chips with AES coprocessors 
to make the encrypting more effective. ZigBee is designed to be low cost and 
power efficient. Bluetooth and RF-radio needs to do the AES encryption in the 
application layer and this requires more processing power on the sensor, which 
leads to a higher energy consumption. AES encryption using 128 bit key length is 
very secure and solves several security issues like integrity and confidentiality. 
Using a link key we can authenticate the sensor to the PDA and guarantee that 
accepted transmissions are form manually accepted sensors.  
8.3 MESSAGE SECURITY  
8.3.1 Mobile telecommunication 
An important factor when developing our solution was to keep it 
independent of transport protocols. Different countries will have better coverage 
for different technologies, and it is important to select the technology that gives 
the best result for the end user. In our solution we suggest using GPRS. GPRS 
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offer the necessary properties for security, data rate, availability, and has high 
coverage. GSM has way too low data rate and is not suitable for our scenario. 
Other technologies like EDGE and UMTS can also be used. These new 
technologies do not function as intended due to low coverage and variable data 
rate. It took 10 years for GPRS to become the leading mobile communication 
standard, and it is assumed it will take just as long for these new technologies 
[31]. However, when they have the coverage to allow the patient to move freely 
as he likes and does not limit him to certain areas, these technologies may be 
used without hesitation because of the transport layer independent design of the 
ebXML messages.  
8.3.2 Message handling 
We propose the ebXML standard as common message standard for our 
solution. The international ebXML standard can be adapted to any kind of 
content and security level. It is also independent of lower layer transport 
protocols. This makes it very well suited to be used in an environment where a 
combination of wireless and wired communication is used. The ebXML message 
standard can also use encryption methods selected by the users, in our case 
AES. The standard has a built-in system for reliable delivery of messages, with 
rules for persistence, retries, error handling and acknowledgments. This makes 
the standard suited for use in a medical environment where reliability and 
security is very important.  
8.3.3 Encryption 
The most important issues when choosing an encryption standard for the 
transmission are provable security strength, processing speed, and versatility. 
The Norwegian Data Inspectorate requires the use of 3DES or better. The 3DES 
encryption has not yet been successfully attacked, but AES encryption is 
stronger due to better design and also the possibility for longer key lengths. AES 
will be secure for many years to come and is around 6 times faster than 3DES in 
software implementations, making it a better choice. AES can be implemented in 
many ways, including encrypting the content of our electronic messages. AES is 
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an international standard, and if any successful attacks should be developed it 
will be known and necessary countermeasure can be implemented.  
8.3.4 Signatures and keys 
We propose the use of digital certificates to prove identity, sign electronic 
messages and distribute encryption keys. Digital certificates can be used to sign 
messages and ensure non-repudiation. When a medical journal is updated it is 
very important that the update is correct and that changes can be tracked. The 
best way to authenticate users is to combine smart cards containing a personal 
digital certificate with the use of a pin code or password. The public key in the 
digital certificates is also used for a secure negotiation of symmetric session keys 
used for the encryption of messages. This provides a simpler and more secure 
way of distributing such keys than having to use a trusted third party as 
intermediary.  
8.4 PRIVACY PROTECTION 
The RBAC model is a thoroughly examined, very well-known model to 
maintain privacy, and suits very well for scenarios with clear job descriptions like 
a medical environment. Users are not assigned permissions directly, but acquire 
them through their role. To keep the privacy and integrity, RBAC use a concept 
called Least Privilege. This means that a user is not given more rights than 
necessary to perform a job. It also utilize a role hierarchy, so a role ri inherits all 
permissions from role rj if all permissions of rj are permissions of ri.  
There are several different propositions on a RBAC model with location 
control. Two such propositions are SRBAC and DIMEDAC. We have adapted 
SRBAC to our scenario, but it is possible to use DIMEDAC, though some 
modifications are needed. The RBAC model itself is very well tested and gives a 
high degree of privacy when implemented and used correctly. With a location 
control it can perform more specific tasks and still maintains the privacy. 
The main advantage of using the SRBAC model in our scenario is the 
possibilities to let the users (i.e. medical staff) have several roles with different 
permissions based on their location. This way it is possible to set the necessary 
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constraints on the users, so they have as little permissions as possible to do their 
job. In addition to their roles, when performing crucial operations on the patient 
journal (EHR) the users have to use a personal smartcard to get access. 
Whenever someone accesses the EHR, the session is logged.  
As it is in the Norwegian Health Network today, information about a patient 
is spread over several databases and getting access to needed information can 
be hard. Our proposal is a local EHR in each medical office, be it a RPG clinic or 
a hospital. To maintain privacy only medical personnel involved in the medical 
care are allowed to access the medical journal. The exception is when an AP is 
asking for a second opinion from other medical personnel at other locations. In 
addition to these local EHR’s, we propose a core journal located at the NHN. 
This core journal contains all the information about a patient, and is constantly 
updated by the local EHR’s when they have made changes on a patient record.   
The main threat to privacy is the access on patient data from unauthorized 
users within an organization, in our case the medical staff. Many medical 
employees are browsing the patient journal to other co-workers or even famous 
people [85]. This is illegal, and to prevent this, we propose the SRBAC model 
using a location control in addition to the concept least privilege. If today’s 
network had the location control, the mentioned example would never have 
happened. We feel confident to have a solution that maintains the privacy of the 
sensitive patient data. 
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9 CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK 
9.1 CONCLUSIONS 
In this thesis we have proposed a suggestion on how existing technologies 
can be used to maintain privacy protection in a mobile health care environment. 
The issue of privacy protection in this type of scenario is very little addressed in 
literature, and we hope our work can contribute to this. In order to protect the 
privacy we have to ensure the security.   
In every part of our scenario we are using 128-bit AES encryption. This is 
a better algorithm that delivers much higher security than the minimum 
requirement from the Norwegian Data Inspectorate, 128-bit 3DES. The use of 
AES guarantees a high security for message transfers throughout the network. 
The use of encryption ensures the integrity and confidentiality.  
We suggest a key management scheme using PKI with digital certificates. 
A central PKI distributes certificates used to guarantee secure identification and 
authentication of the users. The digital certificates are also used to negotiate 
symmetric keys to be used for the AES encryption, and to digitally sign 
messages to ensure non-repudiation.  
ebXML is a international standard for electronic message exchange. The 
use of one common standard simplifies the communication between the 
participants. The advantages for selecting ebXML are good adaptability, 
independence of underlying transport protocols, and it is possible to select the 
wanted security protocols.  
We propose the use of RBAC with location control to maintain privacy. 
RBAC is well suited to administrate access control in a medical environment. The 
added location control makes it possible to restrict access to groups of users 
sharing the same role. This can be used to protect the patient’s private 
information from users who are not directly involved in the medical care of the 
patient.  
We have shown that using the security and privacy technologies 
mentioned above it is possible to protect privacy in a mobile biomedical 
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information collection service.  
9.2 FURTHER WORK 
This report only presents guidelines for privacy protection in a mobile 
biomedical information collection service. In order to make a complete working 
implementation of these guidelines several tasks has to be completed. A more 
detailed description of users, roles, locations and messages must be formulated. 
The users and roles described in our solution are only some examples. A 
wireless mobile biomedical information collection service has several users not 
included in our scenario. Roles and users must be defined based on the needs of 
the health care system. Roles for all users connected to the national health 
network must be created and the permissions these roles are given must be 
defined. The health network consists of several domains, all of who have many 
partitions. These must be defined and users must be assigned to their correct 
location. 
We have only given a brief description of a few of the ebXML messages to 
be used. ebXML messages have to be defined according to all of the messages 
used in the system today, and new messages that are needed but not used 
today must be defined. These message structure definitions must be made 
available to all service providers connected to the health network. 
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